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ABSTRACT
The events of this decade has brought public
attention on the adequacy of United States ports to
serve the nation's needs. Many experts involved in
maritime transportation have noted that the United
States would be able to enjoy economies of scale
associated with large vessels only if the United
States developed substantially deeper ports capable
of handling these large vessels. Although the apparant
advantages and trends to larger vessels in the world
fleet were evident, recent history has seen little
in the way of a response to these percieved needs
for deeper United States ports. This study addresses
important issues concerning the need for additional
port capacity to handle large vessels and presents
some conclusions thereof.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE DREDGING CONTROVERSY
In troduc t ion
Increased attention has been focused upon the ade-
quacy of United States ports to meet the nation's need
t h i s decade. Several developments have converged to
focus this attention on the adequacy of ports. Among the
most prominent developments are the changing character of
shipping into and out of American ports and the untangl-
ing of a social contract between the Federal government
and the ports concerning how dredging should be funded
and implemented. These two developments have been char-
acterized by proposals from many ports for dredging pro-
jects and a stalemate for Federally funded dredging pro-
jects that has existed for over a decade (with major
delay for some ports willing to fund their own dredging).
A powerful motive for developing the c ap ac i t y to hand Le
larger vessels is that such vessels offer lower trans-
port-at ion costs. Proponents for dredging contend that
without t he capacity to handle larger vessels, commerce
into and out of American ports must use s ma Ll, , higher-
cost vessels or larger vessels must enter or leave the
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cost vessels or larger vessels n~st enter or leave the
ports less than fully Lo ad ed , In both cases, h iq h e r
transportation costs are the result. These higher trans-
portation costs may have the effect of increasing the
price of American products on the world market and rais-
ing the price of foreign imports. The controversy over
the present port dredging stalemate involves many issues.
It is hypothesized that the United States needs
additional port capacity to handle large vessels and that
dredging is the most efficient alternative to handle the
larger vessels. Chapters TWO and THREE will address this
hypothesis and present conclusions. Further, the process
of dredging from the planning to the implementation stage
is hampered by fundamental problems that Chapter FOUR
will attempt to portray.
Traditionally, responsibility for dredging has been
divided between federal and local projects. Federal
projects are paid for with congressionally appropriated
funds and are carried out by the United States Army Corps
of Engineers (A.C.E). Federal projects generally deal
with the construction and maintenance of major access
channels, maneuvering areas, and emergency anchorages in
United States ports.
Local projects are characterized by non federal
funding and generally deal with construction and main-
tenance dredging of berths and minor channels, or land-
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fill projects (or both). Local projects do not require
congressional action and are norrnally not man aq ed by
A£.E., but they are subject to detailed regulatory re-
view which rests primarily with A~.E.
Construction dredging normally involves creating new
na v i q a t Lon a L facilities, or the improvement of tbose that
exist by underwater excavation. ~~intenance dred9in~
includes the removal of materials as necessary to keep
facilities at the originally constructed depths and
widths. The physical activities required to carry out
these two types of dredging are similar, however, the
issues associated with them may be quite different.
Differences range from how the decisions to dredge
,0
are made~how the dredging is funded, to regulatory ap-
proval procedures. Although controversy surrounds both
maintenance and construction dredging, clearly construc-
tion dredging - - specifically whether there is a need to
handle larger, deeper-draft vessels, and if so, who
should pay for it - - is the key issue driving the pres-
ent national debate.
Proponen ts of new or add itonal port d r ed q ing have
identified areas of need. First is the need for add I>
tional capacity for handling deep-draft vessels and in-
creased traffic. These deep-draft vessels are mostly
liquid and dry-bulk carriers that require depths of 50
feet or more. Second ly, is the need of s orue ports for
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additional depths to handle vessels requiring 40 to 45
foot depths. These vessels largely consist of the
latest-generation container-ships.
An assessment of the nations dredging needs may re-
quire settling needs in a broader context. It is neces-
sary to understand the role of ports in the world economy
and transportation system in order to assess the need for
additional port capacity.
Trends in Transportation and the World Economy
Foreign trade has not been a significant factor with
regard to United States economic well-being during the
two decades following World War II. However, by the
beginning of this decade 19 percent of the goods produced
in the United States were exported and more than 22
percent of the goods consumed in the United States were
imported (up from 9 percent for both exports and imports
in 1970) (R.B. Reich, 1983). An even more foreboding
statistic estimated that by 1980 more than 70 percent of
all goods produced in the United States would be actively
competing with foreign-made goods (R.B. Reich, 1983).
These economic changes bolster an increasingly widely
held belief that the future economic well being of the
United States is dependent upon the nation's capacity to
compete in a world economy.
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To understand this changing relationship of the
United States to the world economy, one must appreciate
the c hans ing char ac ter of tile n at ion's imports and ex-
ports:
"During the 1970's the share of American mariu f ao e-
tured goods in total world sales declined by 23 percent
vhile every other industrialized nation except Britain
maintained or expanded its share. Arne r Lc a ts d Lm i.n i s h Lnq
presence in the international market has been particu-
larly ua r k ed in capital-intensive, h i q h-ev o Lu rue indu-
stries. Since 1963, the United States proportion of the
world automobile sales has declined by almost one-third.
Un i ted States sa les of indus tr ia 1 mac h inery a Iso dec 1 ined
one-third; sales of agricultural machines by 45 percent;
tele-communications ruac h i n e r y by 50 percent; metal work-
ing rn ac h i n e r y by 55 p e r c e n t ," (R.B. Reich, 1983)
Dur ing the per iod immed iately following Hor Ld War
I I, the Un i ted States exper ienc ed an expor t boom and
supplied some 60 percent of the world's manufactured
goods. As Europe and Japan regained their industrial
capacity, trade between the United States and these other
areas of t~e world moved into balance. During the last
decade the flow of massed-produced industrial goods has
reversed with the United States becoming a major importer
and Europe and the Pacific Rim contries becoming major
exporters.
Presently, United States exports are dominated by
bu Lk commodities such as coal, grain, timber, hig11-
technology products and sophisticated software for com-
munications and computers.
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Figure I, on the following page, illustrates the
changing character of United States trade during t~e past
50 years. In 1947, as the nation supplied the world, the
United States had a $9.5 billion trade surplus.
The vessels that caQe into service following World
Har II were the war surplus tanker, and the Liberty and
Victory g e n e r a l cargo vessels. These small flexible
vessels were nicely accommodated by u.s. ports built in
the 1930s and l540s during an extensive program of public
works. Many of the dredged navigational facilities
authorized for ports during this time are still being
ma in ta ined as they we re c rea ted then.
The economic activies of all nations benefited from
inexpensive r11ddle Eastern oil in the 1960s. Shipowners
began building a different type of fleet to serve the
expanding world trade. Vessels became larger and more
spec ial i zed.
The need was perceived for ports capable of accomo-
dating supertankers as the United States accelerated its
oil imports. After considerable controversy concerning
environmental issues, Congress enacted the Deepwater
Ports Ac t of 1974, wh ich prov Ld ed for the development of
offshore petroleum facilities (Deepwater Ports Act,
197 4). On e 0 f the s e f ac iIi tie s was b u i 1 t by f i v e 0 i 1
c ompan Le s in 1979 (Lou is iana Of fshore Oi 1 Por t ) , howe ve r ,
plans for other such facilities were abandoned as Middle
6
PIGURE 1
8igb1 i9 hts of the u.s. Export and Import Tradez
Exports minus Imports (in millions of dollars)
COmmod tty 1937 1947 1960 1970 1973 1981
Agr icu1tura1 Goods -459 1604 857 558 8023 24308
Puels and Lubr icants 395 1013 -739 -1384 -6369 -71333
Cbemica1s 22 553 1128 2216 3137 11995
Capital Goods 486 3144 4949 10557 13928 45680
Consumer Good s -38 958 -505 -4834 -8481 -22864
Automotive Products 353 1147 633 -2242 -4543 -11750
Military Goods 22 174 804 1230 1385 3608
Other
-184 890 -1226 -3163 -5854 -11325
Total 265 9530 5528 3303 1863 -27566
Souroez W.B. Branson (1984).
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Eastern oil i~ports declined and oil prices increased
tenfold. As a result of these conse~uences, the trans-
port of oil plummetted worldwide.
The global response to accelerating oil costs was to
search for alternative energy sources. One read i Ly
available and abundant alternative was coal, ana nations
quickly sought to substitute coal for some of their oil
imports. This rapid move to coal focused the present
national attention on the inadequacy of our ports. The
United States with its large and readily available coal
reserves, experienced a surge in demand for its steam
coal in 1980. The combination of the Iranian oil disrup-
tion and unstable conditions in other major coal export-
ing nations triggered that demand. Newspapers in the
United States were full of reports citing that large
numbers of colliers were waiting for weeks and even
months to gain access to U.S. coal-loading facilities in
1980.
Du r in9 th is per iod a number of stud ies (EIA, 1981;,
IGF,Inc. 1981; NeA, 1981; Wilson, 1980) concluded that
the United States had an opportunity to become a rna j o r
supplier to the massive new world steam coal market. It
was repeatedly noted that the United States would need to
be able to handle the most efficient dry or combination
bulk carriers requiring water depths greater than those
available in u.s. coal ports, in order to gain and secure
that n.a r k e t ,
The d e v e Lop men t of a world oil surplus, the declin-
ing price of oil, a strong dollar, and the reestablish-
ment of political stabilitj in Poland and labor stability
in Austrailia have reduced the demand for u.s. steam coal
exports since 1980. Whether the present situation with
regard to world energy will be sustained for a long
period of time remains an unanswered question. A rua j o r
oil disruption in the Persian Gulf could trigger renewed
(1 emand for Un i ted States coa 1 expor ts.
The chang ing role of the Un ited States in the
world economy, the changing character of United States
imports and exports, and the unpred ictab le wor 1(1 energy
situation have created substantial uncertainty with re-
gard to port capacity needs. Projecting the future size
and character of world shipping is extremely difficult,
although a few mid- and long-term shipping forecasts have
been made in recent years. Lloyd's Register of Shipping
suggest why such forecasts are not being made by noting
.•• "World shipping and shipbuilding are experiencing the
wo r s t economic recession in the last 50 years and the
interaction of technical, commercial, and political fac-
tors make it very difficult to predict the likely rate of
recovery" (Lloyd's Register of Shipping, 1984).
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The t ot a I vo Lurae of goods and c ommod i t Les carried in
oceanborne trade follows the wor lc1 ec on omy however, the
r e 1 at ionsh ip that pre v ious ly pre vail ed between wor Ld Gl.'lP
growth and growth in demand for oceanborne transport was
disrupted in the 19705. Figure 2, on the following
page, divides oceanborne transport into three catagories:
oil, bulk and other. During the period between 1965 and
1973, the growth in the quantity of oil transported
annually averaged a rate that was more than twice the
rat e 0 f g r 0 \. t 11 0 f t be w0 r 1d GNP. During the per i od
between 1973 and 1980, the quantity of oil being trans-
ported remained almost stable while world Gr-.-rp was q r owi.nq
a an annual rate of 2.3 percent. In the case of bulk
cOffiQodities, the quantities transported continued to grow
more rapidly than GNP but less rapidly than during the
1965-1973 per i od , By compar ison, dur ing the 1973-1980
period, the quantities of other commodities in ocean
transport grew at a rate, when compared to world GNP,
that was roughly twice that of the 1956-1973 period.
One result of these changes and the rationale for
optimistic forecasts was that vessels ordered during the
period of growth became surplus. During both 1982 and
1983, for the first time since World War II, the total
deadweight tonnage of the world fleet declined, yet the
rate of scrapping was insufficent to bring cargo-carrying
capacity into balance with available cargoes.
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FIGURE 2
Annual Average Increase ('), World GNP and
OCeanborne Freight Transportation (In Percent).
1965-1973 1973-1980
t.Ma. ton-miles .twl ton-miles
Total B..d l2.....1 a.a L.2.
au 10.5 16.0 0.2 -1.0
Bulk ~ ll.aZ J.....O. ~
Other 5.2 6.4 4.9 5.7
NP L..6. a.a
Source, Maritime Transport COmmittee (1982)
11
Despite this fact, shipowners continued to order
vessels in 1983, "as covert and overt subsidies encour-
aged owners to replace aq i nq vessels .. in addition the
shipbuilding industry was offering more efficiently de-
signed ships with the emphasis on fuel economy, and
finance was freely available" (Lloyd's Reqister of Ship-
:?ing, 1984).
Particular emphasis has been on containerships which
are typically ewployed in the liner trades. The growth
of trade in goods that can be packed and sbipped in
containers offers partial explanation. The number of
containerships increased 5.7 percent in 1983 and the
vessels container-carrying capacity increased 7.5 percent
(Mar it ime Transpor t Commi t tee, 1984).
Table 1 indicates the variety of vessels in the
world fleet which called at ports in the United States
which we r e engaging in foreign trade, during 1980. Con-
siderable specialization of vessel types can be seen in
this list, much of it matching the changing mix of United
States imports and exports previously discussed. Design
drafts for a number of the b u Lk carriers exceeded the
water depths of many United States ports. Water-depth
limitations prevented bulk carriers with more than 46
feet of draft from being fully loaded, Lnc orni nq or out-
going, in most of the major bUlk-commodity ports in the
12
TABLE 1 Number of Vessels in Foreign Trade Calling on Ports of
the United States, 1980, by Type and Design Draft
II
~ ~ ~ ll:..i5. H=..5..l1. ll:..5.5. 5tt Q.t..Ile.L
Preighter 1730 31 1698 1
Tanker 1077 3 742 123 96 9
Freighter/refrig. 329 11 318
Bulk carr ier 2642 2532 57 44 9
Combo. pass. & cargo 85 5 80
Combo/refr ig • 4 4
Ore/oil carrier 54 29 13 33 9
Whaling tanker 1 1
Containership 322 7 325
are carrier 84 81 2 1
Car carrier 103 102 1
LPG tanker 95 2 93
Colliers 7 7
Asphalt tanker 9 9
Bitumen 5 5
Chemical tanker 193 1 192
LNG tanker 12 12
Molasses tanker 6 6
Phosphorus tanker 3 3
Sulphur tanker 6 6
Wine tanker 1 1
Barge carrier 1 1
Cattle carrier 2 2
Container/barge car. 20 20
Container/car car. 1 1
Container/ Ro-ro 16 4 12
Pallet carrier 6 6
Partial container 421 5 416
Roll-on/Roll-off lS3 14 139
Timber carrier 6 6
Bauxite carrier 1 1
Bulk car carrier 98 97
Bulk/containership 30 30
Bulk/oil 1 1
Bulk/timber car. 1 1
Cement carrier 22 1 21
Limestone 1 1
Ore/bulk/oil 180 48 61 30 41
Salt carr ier 1 1
Wood chip carrier 5 5S
Barge (dry cargo - domes) 5 5
Barge (tanker - domestic) 3 3
Total 7802 84 7105 258 174 173 8
SOUllCE: Maritime Admin istration, Office of Port and Intermodal
Development.
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United States (except Los Angeles, Long Beach, and oil
terminals in Bellingham, and grain ter~inals in Seattle
and Tac oma) •
The changing relationship of the United States to
the world economy and the changing character of the
world's commercial fleet make confident projections of
future shipping patterns extremely difficult. So far as
the needs of United States ports are concerned, and
specifically the need for new construction dredging, the
picture is characterized by great uncertainty. That
uncertainty has doubtless been a factor contributing
to the stalement in new port construction activities.
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CHAPTER THO
PORT CAPACI1Y ISSUES
Introd uc t ion
P roponen ts for add it iona 1 por t capac i ty to aCCOHiIilO-
date large vessels give several reasons: economics,
national security and defense, and tbe need to be able to
respond to future changes in waritime transportation.
This chapter appraises the need for additional capacity
in terms of these three categories of criteria.
Studies conducted by the United States Army Corps of
Eng ineers (A.C .E.) and by the ports of the Un i ted States
identified two categories of deficiency in port capacity:
(1) the 1 imi ted ab iIi ty of tbe Un i ted States to hand Le
large bulk carriers, and (2) the need by some ports to
handle medium size vessels (in particular, the latest-
generation containerships and other specialized or gen-
eEal vessel types of Panamax dimensions). These two
identified needs have been ta~en by many as defining
large vessels (U.S. Army Corps of Eng ineers, 1983).
The range of large bulk carriers cited in proposals
for additional dredged capacity have cargo-carrying capa-
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cities of 105,000 DWT to 150,000 DWT. The latest-genera-
tion containerships referred to vary in length from 800
ft. to 950 ft., and in beam between 105 ft. and 110 ft.
These vessels have cargo-carrying capacities of approxi-
mately 3,500 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) and
require water depths of 37 to 43 ft. Owing to the windage
area of these vessels when containers are loaded on deck,
additional channel width may be necessary, particularly
in bends or turns.
A review of the present port situation in t h e United
States for accornodating large vessels, trends in the
world fleet, arguments for and against creating the capa-
city to handle large vessels, and considerations of
national security and defense follows.
The United States is already paying penalties be-
cause of its limited capacity to accomodate large ves-
sels. Many large vessels call in ports of the United
States less than fully loaded due to the limited water
depths in navigational channels. Data for 1980 indicates
that 3849 port calls were made in the United States by
vessels with drafts greater than 45 ft. However, only
754 of these port calls were at actual drafts greater
than 45 ft. Water depths for most major ports of the
United States become limiting for vessels at about 40 ft.
of draft. Add itional feet of draft are achieved by
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operating vessels in navigational channels at slower
speeds, b::{ taking fu Ll y loaded vessels in or out of port
at high water, and other means, but the additional draft
that can be achieved by these means is limited.
Channel depths at mean low water for the coastal
ports of the United States are listed in Table 2, to-
gether with the number of port calls at vessel drafts at
or exceed ing channel depths (at mean Low water) in 1981.
Data for ships defined in this paper as large ves-
sels for 1980 indicate that 476 vessels greater than
90,000 DWT made 2863 port calls in the United States.
Bulk carriers (liquid, dry, and combination) that would
have drafts of 56 ft. or more fully loaded made 1590 port
calls that year, however, only 236 were at actual drafts
of 56 ft. or more. Of these, 26 were at the deep-water
terminals of Long Beach, Los Angeles, or Puget Sound.
Therefore, less than 13 percent of total port calls by
bulk carriers were at 46 ft. or more in draft. Table 3
presents port calls in 1980 made by large liquid and dry-
bulk carriers at the four ports with approved plans for
construction dredging to accomodate such vessels. Ship-
pers and ship operators dealing in bulk commodities in
these and other ports uniformly emphasize their need to
load additional feet of draft. Draft limitations for
tankers or bulk carriers limit their cargo-carrying capa-
city as follows: for a 150,000 DWT or 200,000 DWT ves-
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TABLE 2 Draft of Vessels Sailing To Or From Selected u.S. Ports - 1981
( ft)
Auth .
Port Depth 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 sz !!!. .!! 50-60
Anchorage, AK 36 2
Anacortes, WA 33(a) 16 18 54 73
Bellingham, WA 30 5 24
Everett, WA 30 25 10 16 11 36
Grays Harbor, WA 30 12 9 23 19 71 1
Kalama, WA 40(b) 7 0 1
Longview, WA 40(b) 18 5 4 1
Olympia, WA 30 21
Seattle, WA 34 112 69 23 98
Tacoma, WA 35 49 36 35 33 39 163
Vancouver, WA 40
Astoria, OR 40 (b) 4 1
Coos Bay, OR 35 25 15 5 2
...... Portland, OR 40(b) 29 22 0 1
OJ Yaquina Bay, OR 40(c) 8 6 4
Humboldt, CA 35
San Francisco, CA 40 2
Redwood City, CA 30 6 1 1
Oakland, CA 35 129 89 28 19 9 8
Richmond, CA 35 66 71 46 28 11 8 3 0 1 3 5
San Pablo, CA 35 300 89 36 14 7 6 3 3 2 1 3 4 1 1 1
Stockton, CA 30
Sacramento, CA 30 76 16 2Los Angeles, CA 45 (d) 5 2 5 13
Long Beach, CA 45(e) 28 21 16 4 12 11 100
San Diego, CA 35 16 6 6
Searsport, ME 35 6 5 5
Portland, ME 45 10 23 1
Portsmouth, NH 35
Salem MA 32
Weymouth, MA 35 8 3
Boston, MA 40
Dorchester, MA 35
Fairhaven, MA 39
Fall River, MA 35 8 32
New Bedford, MA 30
Providence, RI 40 1
New London, CT 33 28
New Haven, CT 35 17 16 20
TABLE 2 (continued I
(ftl
Auth.
Port Depth 30 31 32 33 34 ~ 36 37 39 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 sz u ~ 50-60
Bridgeport, CT 35 10
Albany, NY 32 19 53
New York, NY 45 29 32 33 54 7 23
Newark, NJ 40 43
Camden, NJ 40 (fl 10 20 6 4 2
Philadelphia, PA 40 (fl 31 63 9 1 2 2 3 9 7 9 12
Delaware R. 40 (f1 124 122 37 16 15 13 9 20 16 12 64
Wilmington, DE 40 (fl 14 15 4 2 3
Baltimore, MD 42 159 3
Hampton RoadR, VA 45 24 113 41 95
Newport News, VA 45 7 73
Norfolk VA 45 17 50 41 97
Wilmington, NC 39
~.> Morehead City, NC 40 64 39 6 6 1 1\!) Charleston, SC 35
Brunswick, GA 30 25 1
Savannah, GA 39 47 13
Jacksonville, FL 39 33 2
Canaveral, FL 36 12 1
Palm Beach, FL 33 30 5 5 2 2
Port Everglades, FL42
Miami, FL 39 272
Ponce, PR 30 54
St- Thomas, VI 33 2 2 1 99
Tampa, FL 36 39
Panama City, FL 32 1 2
Pensacola, FL 33 10 1
Mobile, AL 40 157
Pascagoula, MA 39 13 9
GUlfport, MS 30 7
New Orleans, LA 40 391 415
Baton Rouge, LA 40 111
Beaumont, TX 40 114 31
Port Arthur, TX 40 179 46 1
Galveston, TX 40 227 73 3
Texas City, TX 40 51 9
Houston, TX 40 150 60
Freeport, TX 39/36 100 169 11
Corpus Christi, TX 45
tv
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TABLE 2 {continued)
{ft)
Auth.
Port Depth 30 31 32 33 II 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 sz !!!. !! 50-60
Channel 47/45 4 1 1
Harbor IS 47/45 3 1 1
Corpus CH 40/45 35 29 25
a No federal project
b Columbia River Bar limitation of 37 ft.
c Maintained at 32 ft
d Port maintains 51 ft outer channels, 45 ft inner channels
e Port maintains 62 ft entrance channel, 50 ft and 55 ft inner channels
f Maintained at 35 ft
SOURCE: Data from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1981.
TABLE 3 Port Calls of Bulk Carriers and Tankersa at Four Ports in 1980, by Actual and
Design Drafts
Design Draft Actual Draft"
(ft)
-- ---- -- -- ----/ Ex. Total
EXisting Planned Dep. 51 to = or or or 41 to 46 to Port
Depth Depth to 50 55 / 56 = 40 = 42 50 50 Calls
Port
N
~
Baltimore 42 50 165 12 29 897 974
Norfolk 45 55 126 81 53 141 1299
New Orleans 40 55 126 81 53 40 2621
Mobile 40 55 171 2 2 519 532
a Bul k carriers, oil/ore carriers, ore carriers, oie/bulk/oil carriers, and crude oil tankers.
SOURCE: U.S. Maritime Administration, Office of Port and Intermodal Development.
sel, failure to utilize a foot of draft ma y translate
into 3400 to 4900 long tons of lost cargo-carrying caDa-
city. Table 4 lists United States port calls by con-
tainerships in 1980, by comparison with port calls by
other vessels carrying general cargo. Delivery has been
taken in the past three years of several large container-
ships, and some have called at United States ports.
Great care has been exercised in some ports to achieve
transit of these vessels, such as entering or leaving at
high water, instituting one-way traffic separation zones,
and operating at slow speeds. Greater channel din~nsions
may be required if in the future two-way traffic, higher
speeds, or other operational changes are desirable.
Efficiency or higher traffic density may depend on depth.
If vessels overtake or pass one another, or if shipowners
want to be able to enter and leave port at periods of low
water, these operations require more depth (and possibly
greater widths) than one-way traffic, s Lowe r speeds, and
transits at high water.
Thus, the broad implication that can be drawn from
the data presented is that the physical dimensions of
navigational channels in the United States are being used
in some instances to capacity (and beyond).
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TABLE 4 Port Calls by General Cargo Vessels by Draft, 1980 Foreign Trade
Port Calls by Design Port Calls by Actual
Total Port Draft Draft
Vessel Type Calls 1-15 16-45 45-50 51+ 1-15 16-45 45-50 51+ Other
Container- 8336 254 8082 1 333 8002 1
ship
Freighter 14569 373 14195 1197 13364 6 1 1
Refrigerated 2352 75 2277 188 2163 1
Freighter
Car carrier 1180 1162 18 5 619
~) Container! 19 19 19w
car
Container! 637 86 551 58 579
Ro-Ro
Pallet 43 43 43
carrier
Partial 6557 37 6520 199 6537 1
container
Rtl!Ro 3096 314 2782 611 2483 2
Bulk!con- 321 321 1 320
tainership
Total 37110 1139 35952 1 18 2592 33949 8 3 2
SOURCE: U.S. Maritime Administration, Office of Port and Intermodal Development.
World Fleet Vessels and Trends
Tables 5,6 and 7 list the dry bulk and combination
carriers, tankers, containerships and roll-on/roll-off
vessels (Ro-Ros) of the world fleet. Inspection of
Tables 6 and 7 indicat8s that proposals of u.s. ports to
increase their capacity to handle large bulk carriers are
not for the largest of these vessels. The proposals to
dredge deeper channels for 105,000 DWT to 150,000 DWT
vessels encompass approximately 600 vessels in the World
Fleet, however, due to the variation in draft in this
range of cargo-carrying vessels approximately 300 to 350
of the vessels may need to be light-loaded by 1 ft. to 5
ft. to calIon U.S. ports even after d e ep en i nq , Still
remaining are 82 dry bulk carriers and 475 tankers that
are larger and would have to be significantly light-
loaded if they calIon the deepened ports.
Containerships in the world fleet and on order can
be catagor ized in two groups: those hav ing less than 30
ft. of draft (79 percent), and much larger vessels with
container-carrying capacities of 3000 or 3500 TEUs or
more, and design drafts of 37 to 43 ft. Tankers and bulk
carriers tend to be weight-limited and containerships
tend to be volume-limited. Therefore, tankers and bulk
carriers fully loaded with dense cargoes will be at or
near their maximum draft, but containerships loaded with
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TABLE 5 Dry Bulk Carriers in the World Fleet, 1984 (including combination carriers), by DWT and Draft
N
Vl
DWT
0-39,999
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
100,000
110,000
110,000
120,000
130,000
140,000
150,000
160,000
170,000
180,000
190,000
200,000
210,000
220,000
230,000
240,000
250,000
260,000
270,000
Draft (ft)
601 298 329 438 372 428 451 321 127 62 30 1 3 2
1 9 26 19 48 67 66 41 14 1 1
1 9 18 33 133 56 18 18 1
2 3 93 32 114 49 40
5 4 10 15 29
1 1 1 7 1
1 1
1
2
1
6 1
41 33 37 7
9 18 3 8 6
3 10 8 7 7
1 3 7 24 26
75
1 1 77
69
24
38
31
5
3
6
2
5
14
1
4
7
4
TABLE 5 (continued)
Draft (ft)
DWT 0-29.9 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 II 43 44 .li .!! 47 !! 49 50+
280,000
290,000
300,000
310,000
N 320,000
(J\ 330,000
340,000
350,000
360,000
370,000
380,000
390,000
400,000
Total 601 298 329 438 373 437 477 349 184 149 134 273 108 147 82 72 56 55 55 31 38 404
SOURCE: Mardata, Inc.
5090 bulk carriers
993 41 ft+ 20\
404 ft+ 8\
TABLE 5B Dry Bulk and Combination Carriers on Order, 1984, 1984, by DWT and Draft
Draft ( ft)
DWT 0-29.99 1Q~ 32 33 34 ~ ~ 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 !2 50+
0-39,999 31 14 75 63 44 111 150 47 18 44
40,000-49,999 2 20 14 33 4 12 11
50,000-59,999 2 10 6 2 1
60,000-69,999 1 24 5 24 12 2
70,000-79,999 1 5 10
80,000-89,999 1 1
90,000-99,999 2
t<) 100,000-100,999 1
" 120,000-129,999
2
130,000-139,999 2 3
140,000-149,999 4
150,000-159,999 6
160,000-169,999 10
170,000-179,999 3
180,000-189,999 2
240 ,000-249,999 1
280,000-289,999 1
300,000-390,999 2
rotal 31 14 75 63 44 113 170 62 53 48 12 45 13 27 13 7 10 2 0 0 4 33
SOURCE: Hardata, Inc,
N
(X)
TABLE 6 Crude Oil Tankers in the World Fleet, 1984, by DWT and Draft
Draft (ft)
DWT 29.99 30-30.99 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 ~ 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50+
<& inc. 39,999 1994 152 204 114 95 109 136 245 91 50 3 11 1 1 2 2
40,000-49,999 1 1 10 15 43 30 7 6 1 1 1
50,000 1 5 5 14 40 51 19 11 5 5 1 1 1
60,000 1 5 4 17 28 30 29 10 2 1 1
70,000 21 33 12 24 9 5 1 2 1 1
80,000 14 10 11 27 32 25 37 9 2 1
90,000 3 1 3 6 12 7 8 20 11 19
100,000 1 3 5 4 11 6 10
110,000 3 12 18
120,000 2 2 62
130,000 1 82
140,000 30
150,000 2 26
160,000 7
170,000 20
180,000 7
190,000 1
200,000 7
210,000 30
220,000 75
230,000 55
240,000 17
250,000 75
260,000 90
270,000 65
tv
'-0
TABLE 6 Icontinued)
Draft
DWT 29~99 30-30.99 31
280,000
290,000
300,000
310,000
320,000
330,000
340,000
350,000
360,000
370,000
380,000
390,000
400,000
410,000
420,000
430,000
440,000
450,000
460,000
470,000
480,000
490,000
500,000
1ft)
32 .ll l.! 35 36 n. l.!!. 39 !Q 41 42 .!l 44 -45--46 - 47 48 49 50+
30
5
5
27
5
8
2
16
3
1
11
3
10
5
1
. 2
3
1
2
TABLE 6 (continued)
Draft (ft)
DWT 29.99 30-30.99 l.! 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 ~ 46 47 48 49 50+
510,000
w
0 520,000
530,000
540,000 4
550,000 1
Total 1994 152 204 114 95 110 144 261 III 112 77 124 98 68 64 47 47 53 17 39 36 844
SOURCE: Mardata, Inc. 4821 total tankers
1323 - 41+ draft (27%)
1994 - 30' draft (41%)
TABLE 6B Tankers on Order, 1984, by DWT and Draft
Draft (ft)
DWT 0-29.99 30 31 B 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 !! 45 46 47 48 49 50+
0-39,999 135 3 8 8 7 13 14 16 2 3 2
40,000-49,999 4 2 1 3 1 2 4
w 50,000-59,999 2 7 1r-'
60,000-69,999 3 8 3 2 11
70,000-79,999 2 10 2
80,000-89,999 3 6 3 3 3
90,000-99,999 2 1 1
120,000-129,999 1
130,000-139,999 1
160,000-169,999 1
230,000-239,999 1
Total 139 3 8 8 7 13 16 17 2 13 4 33 5 6 6 15 2 0 3 1 0 4
SOURCE I Mardata, Inc.
TABLE 7 Containerships and Roll-On/Roll-Off Vessels in the World Fleet, 1984, by Draft and Length
Over-All
Draft ( ft)
Length Over-All 0-29.9 30 l! 32 33 34 35 ~ 37 l!! 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50+
0-619.9 12042 943 750 382 153 161 40 14 17 11 11 3 1 1 2
620-634.9 36 8 8 3 8 1 2 6 5 1
635-649.9 19 1 8 3 6 10 10 17 1 1 5 1
650-664.9 23 17 13 6 1 8 2 7
665-679.9 12 9 12 2 3 3 1 1
680-694.9 6 11 2 9 3 13 7 17 16 4 4
w 695-709.9 13 7 1 10 3 7 4 4 2 2 1 4 1
N 710-719.9 1 11 3 6 2
720 1 11 1 6 2 1
730 1 6 2 1 5 3 1 2
740 3 12 1 14 1 2 1 1
750 2 3 2 2 3
760 1 4
770
780 1 2 5 1 1
790 4 4 1 1
800 1
805 2 1
810 4
815 1 4 2 5
820 1 1
825 1 2 3 2
830 1
835
840 1 1
TABLE 7 (continued)
Draft (ft)
Length Over-All 0-29.9 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50+
845 5 5
850 1 1 1
855 5 3
860 3 2
865
870
875 2
880 1
w 885 1 1
w 890
895
900 2 1 3
905
910
915
920
925
930
935
940 3 2
945 8 1 2 2
950 8
Totals 12147 996 804 437 192 213 111 74 81 45 40 9 10 3 14 19 3 2
SOURCE: Hardata, Inc. 15,200 Ro-Ros and ships that carry containers
411 35 ft+ (3%)
TABLE 7B Containerships and Roll-On/RoI1-0ff Vessels on Order (1984)
(ft)
LOA- 0-29.9 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
0-619.9 90 2 4 1 5 2 2
620-634.9 2 3
635 2 4
650 6 2 4 1 1
665 5 1
680
695
710
w 720
.j>
730
740
750 2 9
760
770
780
790
800
805
810
815 1 2
820 1
825
830
835 1
TABLE 7B (continued)
W
lJl
LOA-
855-859.9
885-889.9
0-29.9 30 31 32 33
(ft)
34 35 36 37 38 39 40
3
41 42
2
43
945-949.9
Totals
12
117 2 3 4 1 11 3 24 14 6 2 1
170 containerships and Ro/Ros on order 32 - 36 ft draft for more (19%)
SOURCE: Mardata, Inc.
the max i muru number of containers they were designed to
carry rarely approach rnaxinillffi draft.
Some argue that with the great number of smaller
vessels in the world fleet, why are the larger vessels of
concern to ports? First, many of the vessels included in
the tables of the world fleet are designed for short-sea
r ou t e s and coastwise trade. Secondly, the maximum
achievable speed of vessels is related by physical laws
to their shape and length. Since the increase in the
price of fuel, speed requirements have been reduced,
however, any change in the future g i v ing an ad vantage to
speed will favor larger vessels. Third, the transporta-
tion costs per ton of cargo (or container) are lower for
larger than for smaller vessels, as illustrated in
Figures 3 and 4.
Movement to larger vessels has been the trend for
the past two decades due to their lower transportation
costs and higher productivity. This trend was first
evidenced for tankers, and although the lack of deep
water ports in the u.s. and other oil-importing countries
has resulted in the use of smaller tankers to lighter
larger tankers, 72 percent of the world's oil supplies
are carried in tankers 100,000 DWT and larger (Cargo
Research Consultants, 1982). Bulk carriers 100,000 DWT
or more increased their share at oceanborne shipments
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from 6 percent in 1971 to 35 percent in 1980 (Drewry,
1982) .
Large bulk vessels dominate the iron ore trade: 80
percent of iron ore shipments were carried in vessels
100,000 or more in 1981. The trend to larger vessels for
iron ore and coal was reinforced by the introduction of
combination carriers (oil, ore, dry builk), which tend to
be larger than dry bulk carriers. Large bulk carriers
now carry 45 percent of all coal shipments, and 10 p e r «
cent of grain shipments. Among tbe c ommod ities imported
or exported in vessels calling on u.s. ports at 46 ft. of
draft or more in 1980 were corn, edible oils, sugar, iron
ore, sulfer, chemicals, rubber, coal, oil and oil pro-
ducts, and vehicles.
Containerships are replacing older general cargo
vessels due to their higher productivity. The productiv-
ity of containerships appears to increase with their
size. Cargo carrying Ro-Ros of large size are also
growing as a percentage of the world fleet, as they are
flexible vessels able to load and unload in a great
variety of ports, and able to carry cargoes too large or
awkward for packing into containers. Both types of these
vessels in the world fleet are relatively young, 80 to 90
percent are less than 10 years old. Building programs
instituted in the last three years were aimed at replac-
ing smaller with larger containerships and Ro-Ros. The
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latest-generation containerships are entering arouna-the-
world service in attempts by large liner companies to
retain and enlarge their share of markets (Maritime
Transport Committee, 1984).
There exist several possible difficulties in assess-
ing the reasons for the trend to larger vessels. One is
that while larger vessels offer economies of scale in
transportation, tbey mayor may not have higher
loading/unloading costs in port. Another difficulty is
that economies of scale are usually represented in terms
of the costs rather than the actual price of oceanborne
transportation (price differentials do not necessarily
reflect cost differentials).
Other difficulties make shipping hard to assess,
such as light-loading. While shipowners would like to
always depart fu lly load ed, the size of cargoes may be
determined by shippers in a surplus market, therefore the
amounts shipped tended to be smaller than the amounts
consumed (Maritime Transport Committee, 1984). To under-
stand why light-loading occurs requires information about
c
tbe maximum desired size of shipments, frequentty of
delivery, amount of stockpile desired by various cust-
omers, time-value of the stockpile, and the influence of
political decisions and new technology on demand.
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Political considerations are sometimes significant
in decisions determining the c otnp o s i t i on and character-
istics of tile world fleet and its deployment. For ex-
ample, governments subsidize shipyards [or non-economic
reasons and give preference to their vessels when the
governlflent is the customer. Many newly industrializing
nations, that are seeking to build a nie rc h an t marine,
protect their fleets by assigning tllose fleets a share of
the nation's imports and exports. These considerations
may result in agreements reserving cargoes for national-
flag fleets and other stipulations that will enhance or
reduce the need to accomodate large vessels in the
future.
Ports in other maritime nations have percieved a
need to increase their capacity to accomodate large ves-
sels. There presently exist 76 ports worldwide with
depths greater than 55 feet. Most of these ports export
or import one or more major bulk commodity. Some of
these p o r ts have c omp 1 eted expans ion proj ec ts, and more
are underway or have plans for expanding their naviga-
tional facilities.
Other ports that are already between 55 ft. and 64
ft. deep are planning further Lrup r o v e men t s such as
Autwerp and Zeebrugge, Belgium. Richards Bay, South
Africa, has recently completed deepening to 64 ft. and is
now deepening to 75.9 ft. Two countries with ports
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greater than 65 ft. deep noted the need for new deep-
water ports (Kenya and China have indicted plans for a
new deep-water ports). Existing and planned dimensions
of ports elsewhere in the world suggests that a large
nunber expect to need the ability to handle large vessels
in the future.
Economics
The p r imary fac tor in f I uenc ing the rnovemen t toward
larger vessels is that they offer lower transportation
costs. The argument for additional channel dimensions to
handle large vessels is to allow the nation to enjoy the
transportation savings that ultimately flow from using
larger vessels. Without adequate port capacity, large
vessels must either enter or leave U.S. ports less than
fully loaded or U.S. trade must be carried on smaller
vessels. In both cases the cost to the nation will be
higher.
Hucb of the controversy over whether there is a need
to develop a.dditional port capacity to handle large ves-
sels revolves around whether the reduced transportation
costs will be sufficient to cover the costs of developing
the additional capacity. Debate has been focused on
proposals for deepening existing ports. Table 8 indi-
cates the range of costs associated with various propo-
sals for port deepening projects. For projects calling
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TABLE 8 Proposals for Dredging to Depths Between 40' and 46'
Port
Existing
Depth
Proposed
Depth Status
Fall River, Mass.
New London, Conn.
35
33
40
40
$ 66
unav.
Approved, deferred
Recommended by federal
study; being reviewed
for approval
New Haven, Conn. 35 40 $ 23 •
Br idgeport, Conn.
Newark, N.Y.
(Kill van Kull)
35
35
40
40
unav.
$229
Being stud ied
Recommended by federal
study; being reviewed
for approval
Howland Hook
(Arthur Kill) N.Y.
35 40 $ 15/ Being studied
$ 26
Approved; under way$ 5
$ 3 Recommended by federal
study; being reviewed
for approval
unav , Approved; deferred40
40/45
40
30/35
30
16
Elizabeth R.,
Norfolk, v«,
Gowanus Creek
Channel, N.Y.
Port Jefferson, N.Y.
Elizabeth R.,
Norfolk, Va.
35/40 40/45 Recommended by federal
study; being reviewed
with other Norfolk
deepening proposal
(cost included in
over-all proposal)
Charleston, S.C.
Savannah, Ga.
Jacksonville, Fla.
Ft., Pierce, Fla.
San Juan, P.R.
35
38
38
25
36
42
40
44
40
40
$ 73
$ 30/
$ 80
$160
$ 51
$ 65
Being stud ied
•
Be ing stud ied
•
Recommended by federal
study; being reviewed
for approval
Tampa, Fla. 34 43 $178 Approved; nearing
completion
Charlotte Harbor, Fla. 32 40 unav. Be ing stud ied
42
S420 Approved; no
appropr iation
TABLE 8 (continued)
Freeport, Tex.
Corpus Christi, Tex.
Brownsville, Tex.
Grays Harbor, Wash.
Everett
Blair Waterway
TacomA, Wash.
Sitcum Waterway
TAcoma, WAsb.
SAn Pablo Bay, Calif.
Oakland, Calif.
Ricbmond, Calif.
Honolulu, Hawaii
Hilo, HawAii
Apra Harbor, GUAm
Baltimore, Md.
36
40
36
30
30
35
35
35
35
35
35
35
35
42
45
45
42
46
40
45
40
45
42
41
40
40
40
50
S 90
S 90
S 23
S 71
unav.
S 30
S 32
S166
S381
S ?
S 51
unav.
S 4
S 4
Approved
Approved: under way
Recommended by federal
study: being reviewed
(port has expolored
private financing)
Recommended by federal
study; being reviewed
Be ing stud ied
Recommended by federal
study; being reviewed
..
Approved; under wAy
Outer hArbor (S38
million) recommended;
inner harbor deepenin~
being stud ied
Recommended by fader", }
study; being reviewed
for approval
Approved; underway
Be ing stud ied
•
Norfolk:
Newport News, Va.
York R., va,
Mob ile, Ala.
PascAgoula, Miss.
New Orleansl
45
22
40
38
40
43
55
50
55
55
55
S480 Recommended by federal
study; being reviewed
for approval
S500 Being stud iad
S407 Recommended by federal
study; being reviewed
for approval
unav. Being stud ied
S525 Recommended by federal
TABLE 8 (continued)
Baton Rouge, La.
Sab ine-Nec hes
Waterway,
Beaumon t, Port
Arthur, Orange,
Sabine Pass
Barbor, Tex.
Galveston, Tex.
Texas City, Tex.
Houston, Tex.
Preeport, Tex.
Corpus Christi, Tex.
Columbia R.
Bar, Ore.,
Astor ia, Ore.,
Kalama, Longview,
Vancouver, Wash.
Astoria, Ore.
N.Y. Harbor 7
adjacent channels
Stapleton/
Port Jersey
Delaware R.,
transshipment
facUity, Pa.
Los Angeles/
Long Beach, Calif.
San Prancisco, Calif.
SOURCE: Heiberg (1983)
40
40
40
40
36
40
48
40
45/35
40
55/60
45
44
so
55
so
so
so
SO
60
SO
70/60
90
80
55
$344
$139
$167
$270
unav.
unav.
unav.
unav.
$413
unav.
$460
unav.
study; being reviewed
for approval
Be ing stud ied
Being stud ied; port
has sought private
fund ing--now com-
pleting new environ-
mental impact state-
ment required by
court decision
Recommended by federal
study; being reviewed
for approval
Be ing stud ied
•
•
•
•
Be ing stud ied
•
Being stud ied
Approved; under way
for deepening to 55 ft., construction estimates range
from $372 million to $440 million. In each of these in-
stances, the u.s. Army Corps of Engineers' analysis of
benefits and costs concluded that the benefits outweigh
the costs. Many factors influence whether benefit/cost
analyses turn out to be positive or negative. The most
critical single variable is the expected level of use,
which is inherently uncertain.
A primary force driving the d ernand for u.s. capacity
to handle large bulk carriers rests on the expectation
that there will be opportunities for increased exports of
bulk commodities, particularly coal and grain. The
potential world market for u.s. coal has been the most
frequently used rationale for developing additional port
capacity. The landed price of coal in foreign markets
can be heavily influenced by transportation costs. For
example, a recent study concerning the potential advan-
tages of utilizing large bulk carriers for transporting
coal between Hampton Roads and Rotterdam ind icated a cost
per ton differential ranging from $10.33 to $6.95
(Graves, 1984). Depending upon the assumptions used,
these investigators found that transportation costs could
vary by as much as $3.38 per ton. Assuming a landed cost
for coal in Rotterdam of $50 per ton, the differential
transportation costs could range from 14 to 20 percent of
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landed costs. Many analysts believe that the six percent
d ifferen t i alin del i v e r ed cos t s cou 1d , for a 1 0\1/ - val u e ,
high-volume commodity such as coal, make a difference in
u.s. competitiveness. Transportation costs could signi-
ficantly influence the share of the world coal market
supplied by the United States.
Potential benefits to the u.s. grain export trade
handled by large bulk carriers is less clear. First,
because grain has a much higher value per ton, transpor-
tation costs represent a smaller portion of landed costs.
Second, many of the markets for U.S. grain do not have
adequate unloading facilities or ports with sufficient
depth to handle large bulk carriers. However, the Soviet
Union has recently been investigating the possibility of
topping off grain ships in the Gulf of Mexico. In the
case of grain, there is evidence that if additional port
capacity were available, larger amounts of U.S. grain
exports might be carried in large bulk carriers at lower
p r ices.
The relative advantages and disadvantages of being
able to accomodate larger oil tankers are also difficult
to evaluate. Oil is a flexible con~odity that can be
loaded and unloaded by several different methods. There
are additional costs associated with some of the alterna-
tives, ana the delivery cost of oil imports could be
reduced if ports could accomodate larger tankers.
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The po ten t ia 1 ec on ouuc benef its 0 fine r e as ed c ep a-:
city to handle high-value cargo in larger vessels have
not been as extensively debated or studied as those of
increased capacity to handle bulk cargoes. The movement
t owa rd large containerships suggests economic advantages,
however, and the costs of developing the additional capa-
city to handle these vessels in some of the major U.S.
ports may be economically justifiable.
Recent history shows a significant increase in the
quantity of bulk commodities exported from the United
States. However, extreme swings in the price of bulk
commodities can occur over very short periods of time.
To take advantage of rapidly expanding markets, the
nation would benefit from having available port capacity
when the swing is upward. Because the buyers of bulk
commodities are often concerned with the delivered price,
inability to accommodate optional vessel sizes and types
may affect the nation's ability to secure long-term
agreements that at least minimize the freight rate (H~.
Drewry, 1981).
The United States faces great uncertainty with re-
gard to the size and character of the world economy, the
nature of future oceanborne transportation into and out
of U.S. ports, and the future mix of commodities that the
nation will export and import. The size and character of
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future u.s. world trade ano oceanborne transport is not
predictable over any length of time with any degree of
reliability. Decisions with regard to developing addi-
tional port capacity, therefore, must be made with the
recognition that the fundamental reality is an uncertain
future.
Lead Times
The nations dilemma with regard to the port capacity
question revolves around the fact that future needs are
uncertain. Short-term needs may experience substantial
fluctuation from year to year, and the development of
additional port capacity requires that sustained programs
carried out over many years. In the case of major fed-
eral dredging projects, the lead time may be up to 22
years. Assuming that those lead times can be substan-
tially reduced, there is a mismatch between the uncertain
and fluctuating character of needs and the activities
requ ired to deve lop por t capac i ty. In sum, the nat ion's
decisions with regard to developing additional port capa-
city must find some accomodation between what will likely
be a continuing uncertainty about the need and the long
lead times required to develop that additional capacity.
Stated simply, the nation's choice is: "What should be
done in the face of uncertainty?"
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A review of the debate over additional port capacity
in navigational facilities indicates its complexity. A
first argument made by some opponents is that the prices
charged for ocean transportation have little relationship
to costs. Rates vary with surplus and scarcity of ves-
sels relative to cargoes. When vessels are in surplus,
unit prices for transport in large versus small vessels
vary less than the difference between unit costs. Sec-
ondly, the historical movement to larger vessels reflects
fashion more than economics, but the movement was p a r t Ly
subsidized by nations in an attempt to keep their ship-
yards busy. Thus, many nations have continually subsi-
dized the building of subsequent generations of vessels.
Thirdly, the pattern of developing additional port capa-
city to handle large vessels may reflect fashion as much
as compelling economic reasons. Fourth, the United
States is such a major factor in the world economy and in
world oceanborne transportation that shipowners will
build their ships to ensure that they are able to use
U.s. ports. That is, the United States can set the
standard for vessel size, with that standard being exist-
ing port capac ity and it does not need to develop add i-
tional port capacity. Finally, most of the major compet-
itors with the United States for the world's coal market
are countries such as South Africa where the government
controls the mines, the railroads to the ports, and the
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ports. These countries will, as a matter of national
policy, ensure that their coal always sells for less than
American coal. Some of the arguments made by propo-
nents are:
(1) pr ices charged for transporting c orumod ities do
in fact, over the long term, reflect costs, therefore,
the economies-of-scale associated with large vessels are
reflected in pr ices;
(2) only if the United States is able to take advan-
tage of low-cost transportation, will it be able to
maximize its competitiveness in the international economy;
(3) even though other countries may, as a matter of
national policy, provide coal for lower prices than the
United States, the range of the price differential can
make a substantial difference in the United States share
of the market (for instance if the price differential can
be kept small by efficient transport, many countries will
pay a marg inally higher cost to be assured of the secure,
stable supply offered by this country);
(4) faced with a growing trade imbalance of over
$100 billion, the United States can not pass up any
opportunity to increase its exports; and
(5) given the long lead times necessary to develop
port capacity, the United States has no choice but to
move ahead with port development in the face of uncer-
tainty.
The above opposing arguments made with regard to
port capacity and its economic implications are not suc-
ceptible to resolution by studies. They reflect differ-
ing perceptions of what will occur in the future, includ-
ing the U.S. role in the wor Ld economy, and they
sometimes have&nstated~unstated premises
reflect differing views about whether or not the federal
government should underwrite the costs associated with
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developing additional port capacity. Much of this debate
is driven by differing perceptions regarding the appro-
priate role of the federal government to port funding,
with the key issue being whether tax dollars should be
used for creating additional channel depths. Channel
depths in Norfolk are 45 ft., yet the Navy has specified
that berths for its aircraft carriers should be 50 ft.
Before the largest carriers can transit the channels into
the Norfolk Naval Facility, they must unload all their
aircraft and pump off most of their fuel. This questions
whether existing depths are appropriate if rapid access
needs to be assured.
In the case of logistical support, the Military
Sealift Command expects to use vessels from the U.S.-flag
fleet and those of national-flag fleets in NATO. Given
the movement toward larger and specialized vessels, a
continuing analysis of port navigational facilities would
appear to be necessary.
Finally, the United States is heavily dependant on
foreign suppliers for stategic materials. There is no
evidence that the need for additional port capacity to
meet the nation's strategic materials needs are being
coordinated in any meaningful fashion with other
defense/security needs and being communicated to the
Corps of Engineers.
51
Sm"J-HARY
The United States has very limited capabilities to
take advantage of any benefits that may be offered by
larger vessels. Only two of the nations ports (Los
Angeles, Long Beach) can handle dry bulk carriers at more
than 90,000 DWT, and only a limited number of the
nation's major container ports can readily handle the
latest-generation of these vessels. The nation's present
capacity to handle these vessels is limited, although
evidence is mixed on the rate which large vessels will
increase and is unclear about what the optimum size of
large vessels will be. Therefore, the United States has
little flexibility to respond to any developments which
emphasize or accelerate the advantages of using large
vessels.
The nation faces an uncertain future with regard to
the quantity of its exports and imports and the mix of
cargoes that its ports will need to hand Le , In order to
take advantage of any benefits offered by large vessels
in the future, the nation must undertake the development
port capacity now. This is because developing port capa-
city to handle large vessels requires many years. What-
ever the source of funding, the cost of increasing port
capacity is high and the decision to develop such capa-
city involves risk.
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There exists no body of data or analyses available
now or likely to be available in the immediate future,
which will create a consensus on this question. How-
ever, many agree that faced with this uncertainty, the
nation should develop a sufficient capability to allow it
to be able to respond flexibly to whatever opportunities
develop in the future. The United States needs addition-
al, but limited, capability to assure that it will be
able to capture the benefits that may develop from being
able to handle larger vessels in the future.
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CilAPTER TEREE
ALTERNATIVES FOR HAIIDLING LARGE VESSELS
fla-jor Options
This chaDter describes five alternativ es ~ r op o sed to
acc o mod a t e large vessels and c o mpa r e s t h era wi t h n a v i q a-:
tional safety, economics, environmental aspects, and
national security/defense Lmp Li.c a t Lon s , These alterna-
tives are in various stages of development. The five
principal options are:
Al t e rn a t i ve means of c ar ':J 0 tr ans fe r accompany
several of these options. Dry transfer of crushed or
pelletized cargoes by conveyor belts, tramways, mono-
rails; or pipeline transfer of bulk liquids or slurried
solids, may serve as an alternative to dredging. While
slurried transfer of iron ore, copper ore, and coal has
b e e n well establishea for long-distance transfer over
land, its use in loading s h Ip s is relatively new. The
use of tramways and monorails are limited in use to high-
density, high-value cargoes such as copper ore, and it is
uncertain whether sufficient co~mercial or mi l i t a r y
interests exist to carry forwarc the engineering develop-
ment of tramways or monorails.
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(1) Construction Dredging, underwater excavation of
materials to create a wider/deeper channel for
larger vessels, can be undertaken at existing
ports. Construction dredging refers to the
excavation of virgin materials either to create
or improve these navigational facilities.
v7h i 1 e the p Lac eme n t 0 f d r ed 9 ed rnat e ria 1 is
often incidental to the objectives of dredging,
it is sometimes the primary objective -- creat-
ing landfill, for example, to expand t e r rn i naL
facilities. In the proposals of some ports for
construction oredging, enlarging the naviga-
tional facilities and creating landfill for new
or expanded terminals are equally important in
accomodating large vessels.
(2) Offshore termina La des igned to accomod ate d eep-
draft vessels and are usually designed for one
commodity. Several different types are now in
service in many parts of the world. As for the
advantages and disadvantages of offshore ter-
minal s, Soros (1983) emphas i zes the protec t ion
of coastal resources as the primary advantage,
and among the disadvantages, lists the follow-
ing for marine operations: (1) the tug-ship
operation in the open sea, (2) the dock ing
approach, especially with adverse winds, waves,
and currents, (3) attachment of mooring lines
to buoys, dolphins, and piers, and detachments,
and (4) decisions concerning when to leave
berth owing to worsening weather. The princi-
pal constraint acting against construction of
offshore terminals is their high capital costs.
The principal types of offshore terminals are:
fixed offshore structures and terminals,
single-point and spread-type offshore moorings,
floating terminals and storage caisson termi-
nals.
(3) New deeowater ports or offshore terminal
islands represent major regional or national
commitments. New multicommodity harbors (such
as Europort) and new deep ports for one or two
commodities have been built in other countries,
and proposals have been advanced in the u.S.
for such developments. The obstacles that
would have to be overcome by such proposals far
exceed those of dredging existing ports in the
u.S. (and indeed, dredging and land reclamation
would be significant in creating this new
port) •
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(4) Hide-beam ships, with substantial cargo-
carrying capacity and drafts compatable with
the depth limitations typical of ports in the
United States, have been proposed and designed,
but not built. Among the problems to be re-
solved are structural design, maneuverability,
and power r e qu iremen ts. Hyd ronau tic s, Inc.
(1982), Roseman (1979), Roseman et ale (1974)
and Roseman and Barr (1984) describe the devel-
opment and analysis of designs for dry bulk
carriers of 60,000 DWT to 200,000 DWT, having
restricted drafts of 35 to 55 ft. Relatively
wide-beam vessels have been built and operated,
but most of those 100,000 DWT or more are not
restricted-draft designs, and exceed the water
depths of almost all u.s. ports, fully Lo ad ed ,
Ivide-beam vessels are sensitive to und e rk e e L
clearance and can be more difficult to maneuver
in restricted waters (Landsburg et al., 1983).
Very wide-beam vessels (140,000 DWT or more) of
greatly restricted draft would require addi-
tional channel widths, and may exceed the reach
of existing loading equipment for dry bulk
commod it ies in U.s. ports. The ad van tag e of
wide-beam vessels, restricted-draft vessels is
that given a specific draft limitation, they
are more economical than smaller vessels with
conventional proportions. However, for cargo-
carrying capacities above 100,000 DWT, foreign
shipowners have so far been unwilling to accept
the draft limitations of U.S. water depts as a
design criterion.
(5) Lightering of incremental cargo may be used
to lighten incomming vessels to drafts compat-
ible with channel depths or to top-off outbound
vessels. Transfer terminals, enabling rapid
and economical transfer from barges to ships,
have recently been constructed at New Orleans,
and self-unloading barges have been built for
top-off services on the East Coast (Dowd,
1983). The advantages of lightering/topping-
off services are: potential use by several
ports and many shippers, low capital invest-
ment; rapid and progressive implementation;
costs borne directly by users, and the flexi-
bility to use topping-off vessels in other
funtions. The disadvantages, depending upon
particular circumstances, are: higher risks of
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vessel time required to load cargoes; and de-
pendence upon weather if cargo is to be carried
out in the open ocean.
There appear to be no effective alternatives to
inner harbor areas for the transfer of containers, owing
to the large amount of space required. A trend emerging
with operation of the new large containersllips is to
designate a major port for calls by these vessels, and to
use feeder ships to collect and distribute containers to
and from other ports. While this might have some ilopli-
cations for dredging, the trend is too recent to eval-
uate. The cargo-transfer alternatives previously de-
scribed have all been developed for bulk and break-bulk
cargoes.
The alternatives described need to be evaluated in
the specific context of their proposed applications for
capital costs; compatability with existing infrastruc-
ture; and with existing land and sea transport, opera-
tional costs, environmental considerations, and safety.
No general characterization can be made of the dominant
considerations or unique circumstances that would guide
the choices to be made . in a particular location.
Economic Aspects of Options
Of the alternatives considered in this chapter, the
construction costs of a new deepwater port would appear
to be the greatest and those of topping-off services the
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least. Cost e s t i ma t e s have not been developed for the
onl~ recent new-port proposal in the United States (in
the Lowe r Delaware Bay). A f i v e-ey e ar $10 million s t ud y
of the Delaware Bay proposal has been suggestea (Gaither,
1983). Owing to the number of existing ports ana t he i r
competition with one another for cargoes, it has been
statea that several ports in a region would have to
participate as investors in the development of a new
port. They also would have to continue to support it
with f e ed e r and transshipping services. A group of ports
in a region might not be able or willing to make such a
large investment. It is possible that some conbination
of federal, state, and local investment guarantees would
be necessary, as well as formation of a public-private,
or very large private consortium to finance and manage
such a project. Prospects for such developments in the
United States appear questionable.
As indicated previously, the construction costs for
dredging the five ports with proposals for dredging to 50
or 55 ft. range between $278 million and $440 million.
The range of estimated construction costs for dredging at
each of the five ports, proposing to accomodate the
latest-generation containerships, is between $3 million
and $80 million. For containerships, there appears to be
no effective alternative (other than new deepwater ports)
to dredging existing facilities.
For liquid or dry-bulk commodities, the economic
advantage of deepening existing ports and harbors in
cornpar ison to the non-port al ternat i ves is that load ing
and unloading is assured if the vessel can be brought to
port. Offshore alternatives are all weather-sensitive to
a degree and t h i s can affect ship schedules. Since the
alternatives tend to be specific to location, commodity,
timing, intended throughput and active volumes handled.
Offshore t e r mi n a Ls already installed in waters of the
Un i ted States are all 0 i 1 termina Is, and these are not in
every case competitive with transshipment from larger
into smaller tankers for unloading in existing ports.
This may be due to timing or to a combination of factors
that different market conditions would reverse.
Proposals for coal slurry pipelines to carry coal
from mines to deepwater terminals have estimated costs of
$140 million to $750 million (Betram, 1982). The eco-
nomic competitiveness of coal slurry transportation and
loading systems depends, in part, on achieving lower
inland transportation costs. Costs associated with the
terminal end of such systems are almost certain to be
higher than those at existing terminals, and could only
be competitive when loading large bulk carriers. To pay
for themselves, offshore coal terminals would need to
handle susbstantial volumes.
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A wide-beam vessel of 120,000 DWT capacity and 38
ft. draft has been estimated to cost $120 million to
build in the United States, in 1980. Estimates have not
yet been developed for larger wide-beam vessels with very
shallow drafts (Bertram, 1982). Large vessels of extreme
proportions may have hidden systems costs, and may not be
competitive with already existing large bulk carriers.
Except in special cases, given the worldwide surplus of
very large carriers of oil, coal, ore, and the low cost
of using already existing large carriers, constructing a
fleet of vessels to such specifications appears unlikely.
One of the principal reasons for design studies of these
vessels in the United States was to potentially give the
U.S.-flag mer c han t marine a larger bulk-carrying capa-
city. This motivation has been clouded by the uncertain
economic return that could be expected from such vessels
in competition with the existing heavily overtonnaged
world bulk-carrier fleet. There probably will be a need
to reserve a percentage of U.S. coal exports for the
vessels, however government intention to elirniriate subsi-
dies for the construction and operation of U.S. flag
vessels will complicate matters.
Of all the alternatives considered, topping-off has
the shortest lead times and the lowest capital invest-
ment. Investments already have been made in three tech-
nologies (floating terminals, self-unloading ships, and
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self-unloading barges), and the existing capability en-
ables short-term response to the need to load large-
volume bulk carriers. To gain the needed return on
investment depends on the willingness of shippers and
shipowners to pay the additional costs, and spend the
additional time for topping-off operations. Therefo re,
the charge per ton (averaged over total tons carried)
cannot exceed the transportation cost-savings per ton of
using larger vessels, and for the past few years this bas
represented a relatively small difference.
The economically most attractive alternatives for
accomodating large vessels appear to be construction
dredg ing of existing ports and lightering/topping off.
Dredging of existing multicommodity ports is attrac-
tive for the following reasons:
(1) Economies of scale associated with large ves-
se ls are prov id ed for all c o mmod it ies and c ar-
goes which could benefit.
(2) Existing mu Lt Lc o mmod Lt y , multipurpose ports
offer ec on otu Ic protection against the volatile
fluctuations of trade in single commodities.
(3) Existing ports represent already sizable in-
vestments in terminals and other port facili-
ties and services, as well as established in-
frastructures of inland transportation. Among
the existing services of ports are worldwide
sales organizations (allowing them to pursue
v igorously whatever cargoes are available).
There are, however, some associated risks with
d redg ing: the capacity created in anticipation of demand
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may exceed actual demand or fail to serve it, and the
emergence of new technologies could make improvements
obsolete.
Navigational Aspects of Ovtions
The navigational advantages and disadvantages of
various alternatives for accommodating large vessels
cannot be assessed without well-developed plans. Any
engineered system represents a set of compromises between
several goals; for example, between project cost and
safety, and forces and features of a particular environ-
ment.
Dredging of existing ports offers the opportunity to
enhance the safety margins of vessel operations in
approach channels and within the sheltered waters of a
port. New construction dredging also offers the oppor-
tunity to accomodate even larger vessels and more traffic
in these navigational facilities with smaller margins of
safety. Therefore, the contribution to navigational
safety of new construction dredging in existing ports
depends upon adequate design, maintenance, and opera-
tional practices.
Offshore terminals are located in deep water, as
opposed to the protected waters of coastal ports and
harbors, but their relatively greater exposure forces in
nature has not resulted in higher rates of casualties
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than s i mi l.a r port and harbor operations. Docking and
u nd oc k Lnq may be simpler than the equivalent operation at
port terminals, and offshore terminals may reduc e port
vessel traffic.
A particular problem for offshore t e r iu i n a Ls (if tug
assistance is required) is the availability and capa-
bility of oceangoing tugs. Tugs which are used to assist
harbor maneuvers are not designed for open ocean condi-
tions, and the tugs designed for oceangoing functions are
not designed for the maneuverability of docking and un-
docking operations.
The contributions of a new deepwater port to naviga-
tional safety could be substantial, but this would depend
upon the relative importance of this criterion as a
design goal. The opportunity to enhance navigational
safety by providing ideal channel layouts and approaches
may be considerable. Any comparison wou Ld have to take
into account the specific circumstances and character-
istics of existing ports in the region that might be
improved versus those of the new port.
The preliminary tests of extremely wide-beam,
shallow-draft vessels for inherent controllability by
computer simulat ion indicate that they are unresponsive
(Eda, 1983, Aranow, 1983). The problems exhibited in
simulated maneuvers can probably be solved by very La r q e
rudders, rudders of different design, and other adjust-
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men t s , but these could also effect the vessels' ec on omic s
in greater power requirements. Large wide-beam vessels
wi t h d rafts of 50 to 60 ft. have been bu il t and ope r a t ed
successfully. Depending on their dimensions and trade,
such vessels could require additional dredging in Qany
u.s. ports. A large wide-beam vessel of shallower d r a f t
could require channel widening for navigational safety.
An additional navigational concern for wide-beam vessels
is narrow bridge openings. These already present a
navigational hazard in many u.s. channels (Marine Board,
1983) •
Topping-off or lightering operations carried out in
semi-protected or unprotected waters (where sufficient
water depth is available) imply some dependence on
weather. For midstream loading, winds acting on the
unloaded or lightly loaded vessel are perhaps the factor
of most concern in operations. Generally, the naviga-
tional safety of lightering, topping-off, and midstream
transfer are about the same as for offshore terminals,
with the obvious difference of involving two vessels, and
for oil transshipments, have been carried out for many
years without major casualites.
Environmental Aspects of Options
Potential environmental effects of some alternatives
for handling large vessels are associated with construc-
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tion or the disposal of dredged material, others are
principally associated with the vessels and their cur-
goes. This study does not assess or compare these
latter risks in detail.
The potential environmental effects of any alterna-
tive are highly site-specific, and adverse effects may be
adverted or mitigated by conscientious planning, siting,
engineering, and operations. Some general observations
about the potential environmental effects of the alterna-
tives are offered here.
The environmental implications of new construction
dredging vary with the specific characteristics of the
project, the characteristics of the physical and biolo-
gical environment of the project and disposal sites, and
other factors, and can only be known in site-specific
studies. Some general points deserve mention for c oiup a r>
ative purposes:
(1) potentially adverse environmental effects can be
caused by dredging and the disposal of dredged material;
(2) adequate planning, design, action, and follow-up
activities give reasonable assurance of minimizing and
managing environmental consequences of dredging and dis-
posal of dredged material (an adequate base of scientific
and technical knowledge exists to guide decisions and
action) ;
(3) dredg ing may have some env ironmental advantages
removal of contaminated materials (if properly ma-
naged), beach replenishment, and wetlands rehabilitation.
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As indicated previously, there are environmental
advantages to locating certain terminals offshore, and
those of the United States are sufficiently far from
shore to ensu re max imurn protec t ion of coas ta 1 res ou rc es
and concentrations of population from catastrophic or
operational pollution and accidents. For coal terminals
(none exist presently in t he U.S.), questions of environ-
mental implications might be raised about the fluid me-
dium in the slurry, and its ultimate fate and effects.
It is likely that the greatest change to the local
environment from the creation of a new port would occur
with shores ide developments, particularly as the sites
proposed for new port development have little existing
landside infrastructure. Dredging would also be required
in these locations, even though existing water depths are
greater than the natural depths of existing ports, to
create berths and other facilities, and to make depths
uniform. How much dredging would be required (and the
environmental effects) depends on the design and layout
of the port, and on its site-specific characteristics.
A detailed risk and consequence assessment would be
necessary to determine the level and severity of hazards
posed to the environment and surrounding populations from
vessel casualties. Environmental implications of wider-
beam ships would appear to be comparable to those of
full-form tankers, with one major exception, and that
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exception is that channels may have to be widened rather
than deepened, particularly if two-way traffic is de-
sired. As with any dredging project, the potential
exists for adverse environmental effects.
Concerns have been expressed about the environmental
effects of topping-off large bulk carriers with coal in
the lower Delaware Bay (Biggs et al, 1984). These con-
cerns center on the fates and effects of coal lost to the
air and water in the transfer operation. Environmental
concerns have not been raised for topping-off in the Gulf
of Mexico, or for midstream transfer in the Mississippi
Eiver, where the operations are viewed as comparable to
coal loading at a port terminal (Chatagnier, 1983).
There are no ports in lower Delaware Bay: the anchorage
proposed for coal topping-off has been used for oil
transshipment and is regulated by the U.S. Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard conducted an environmental assessment in
reviewing the permit application (the permit was gran-
ted), but authority over the environmental quality of
Delaware's coastal waters was claimed by the State De-
partment of Natural Resources and Env ironmental Control
and Delaware law has been interpreted to prohibit the
proposed topping-off activities.
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NQtional Security and Defense Aspects of OQtion s
Much of the nation's contingency planning for na-
tional security an0 defens e involves oceanhorne transpor-
/
tation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, estimate t ha t for any
major overseas d e p l oy me n t , 95 percent of all dry cargo
awl 90 p ercent of all p e t r o Leu m will move by sealift.
The a r rned forces appear to have q i v en little a t t en t i cn to
the security and defense related aspects of port ::1r e d 9 i n 9
in the United States an~ the propos ed alternatives (Gen-
e r a L Accounting Office, 1983). Re v i ew of these as p ec t s
is t h e r e f o r e somewhat speculative.
As no ted prev iou s ly, some combo. tan t v esse 1 s bC1 v e
greater de~th requirements than are now proviaed by the
navigational channels they use or propose to use. W~ile
operational flexibility (such as waiting for high water,
...c!1\"
light-loading, and one-way traffic) may'be ade~uate in
all situations. The same consideration may apply to the
n onc omb at an t vessels use. If the c ap ac ity to acc orunod a t e
vessels with greater depth resuirements is needed ~y some
combination of combatant vessels and those to be used for
mobilization or the transport of strategic materials,
t hen new construction dred ging of existing ports offers
the maximum contribution to national security and de-
fense. (The existence of ports that are able to r espond
to all three needs broadens the nation's capability to
support these activities.
,. .Ou
Possible contributions of offshore terminals are
somewhat equivocal: they may present a valuable option
or additional vulnerability. They may also have no po-
tential contribution, positive or negative, depending
upon the c ornmod i t i e s handled. New deepwater ports, on
the other hand, could offer the opportunity to include
defense facilities or features that might be difficult to
achieve at existing ports, but this is a contingent
opportunity that has not been addressed.
There seem to be few Lmp 1 ica t ions for na t i on aL se-
curity or defense from the introduction of large wide-
beam vessels. Alternatively, the flexibility of topping-
off and 1 ig h t e r ing ser v ices cou Ld prove importan t in
moving strategic materials or petroleum.
As implied in the preceeding sections, new construc-
tion dredging of existing multicommodity ports gives the
nation the greatest future flexibility among the options.
Assuming that offshore terminals are for single com@odi-
ties, they offer little additional flexibility for the
Unites States, and it might be argued that they increase
the nation's inflexibility. On the other hano, they are
a -proved technology that can be provided on the pipeline
infrastructure without demands for space on the portIs
waterfront, and this enhances flexibility.
A new deepwater port cou Ld clear ly add to the na-
tion's future flexibility, if it were planned as a muLt L-
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purpose port hand Linq a mi x of cargoes. Alternatively,
if the deepwater port were primarily a s Lnq Le-ec ommod i t y
port, it would offer less future flexibiit y than the
deepening of an existing mu Lt Lcornmod i t y port. If the
investment required that the new port have a regional
monopoly on port services, however, future flexibility
wou Ld clear ly be reduced.
The contribution of wide-beam sbips to future flexi-
bility appears minimal, since they do not seem to be
competitive with deep-draft vessels. The lightering/top-
ping-off option, on the other hand, offers the nation a
short-term, low cost response to hand 1 ing large-volume
bulk carriers. It appears attractive where volumes of
dry-bulk commodities are sufficient to repay the invest-
ment. It is not likely to be offered for certain commo-
dities in particular circumstances, nor can it substitute
for additional channel depths to accommodate container-
ships. The option contributes to present as well as
future capacity to accommodate large-volume vessels, but
cannot be expected to meet all the needs projected.
Surnman'
Of the five options for increasing the nations's
capacity to handle large vessels, measured against the
criteria of economics, navigational safety, environmental
implications, national security/defense needs, ana future
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flexibility, two of the options stand out as being most
attractive. Assuming that a prudent society can ill
afford to move into the future without the capacity to
handle large vessels, then lightering/topping-off and
dredging existing ports are clearly the most attractive
two options. This necessarily general judgment does not
exclude any of the other options, which may be attractive
for some particular application now or for different
c Lrc u ms t anc e s in the future.
Lightering/topping-off is a developecl and available
technology that is sufficiently flexible to meet short-
term contingencies and serve developing needs. Its short
lead times allow the market to measure its attractive-
ness. Alternatively, new construction dredging of exis-
ting ports cannot respond to short-term market changes.
The lead times for new construction dredging are long,
and the short-term future uncertain. The reason for
developing at least a limited program of new construction
dredging in this country at existing ports is that dredg-
ing offers the most secure response to an uncertain
future. That more secure future results from the fact
that construction dredging puts the United States in a
position to take advantage of the changes in maritime
transportation that have already occurred, those that can
be projected in the near future, and those that may
occu r .
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Two lesser catagories of dredging to handle larger
vessels can be distinguished. One is dredging to accom-
modate vessels requiring 40 to 45 ft. of water depth.
The most frequently cited need is that of the latest-
generation containership, but there are many vessels in
the world fleet in this mediuQ-size category, and con-
tainer ports that handle a range of commodities could
benefit from being able to accomodate more and larger
vessels of all types. Evidence suggest that these are
needs that exist now. Given the heavy existing invest-
ment in cargo-handling facilities in those ports, the
well-established inland transportation systems serving
them, and the expectation that the quantity of cargoes
carried in medium-sized vessels will increase, there is
cOITvelling reason to assure that construction in this
medium-depth range can be carried out by the ports that
can justify it.
The second category includes dredging to accomodate
larger bulk vessels requiring depths of 50 to 55 ft. (or
more). The prudent choice, given an unpredicatable fu-
ture, is to ensure that the nation has future flexibi-
lity. This conclusion does not entail dredging all the
proposed deep-water bulk-commodity projects that have
been put forward, nor does it suggest the number or order
of ports to be dredged to depths of 50 or 55 ft. or more.
72
The future flexibility criterion does suggest that the
nation should have a rninium of deep-draft capability on
e ac h of the coasts.
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CH.\P':CEP FOUR
FUNDI NG ISSUES
AND THE INSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING SYSTEf.1
Historical Overview
Three regularly identified barriers to dredging that
complicate the present port dredging stalernate are: lack
of national funding, institutional problems and environ-
mental problems. This Chapter addresses the first two
barriers.
The U.S. Army Corps of Eng Lne e r s has had pr imary
responsibility for dredging of United States ports sinceI'the beginning of the ~ h century. There was a consensus
that dredging would be paid from General U.S. Treasury
revenues, however, that consensus on funding began to
unravel in the 1970's.
Four factors, however, are repeatedly identified as
contributing to the erosion of the legislative consensus
that funding should come from general revenues: (1) the
Federal budget deficit, (2) the high cost of new con-
struction dredging (and possibly increased maintenance
dredging), (3) problems of initiation after a long stale-
mate, (4) changing social values and attitudes.
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~/1any considerations have contributed to the d eru i s e
of the consensus in Congress that general funds should be
used to fund port dredging. What appears clear is that
before new dredging programs can be undertaken, the old
consensus must either be reestablished or a new met hod of
funding must be found. The rapid rise in coal exports
f rom the Un i ted States in 1980 r e su 1 t ing from the comb i-
nation of the Iranian oil disruption, political difficul-
ties in Poland and labor problems in Australia, together
with the backlog of proposed port projects gave major
impetus to the search for a new fund ing consensus.
Before a new funding consensus can be established
for port dredging, and therefore, before stability can be
returned to the port funding process, five interrelated
issues will need to be resolved. First, a formula must
be established which determines who will pay for dredg-
ing. At its most general level, this choice involves
deciding whether, and if so, what portion of funding will
be paid for from general tax revenues. If that portion
is anything less than 100 percent, then a determination
will have to be made concerning who will be required to
pay and what mechanisms wLl L be u s ed to collect the
fund s .
Secondly, it will be necessary to determine who will
collect the revenues. Revenue-raising responsibility can
either res t tota lly with the fed eral g o v e r mne n t, tota lly
7S
with individual ports, or it may be shared. Sharecl
responsibility ("cost sharing") implies that some portion
of the revenues will be raised by the federal government
and some portion by the individual ports, with an
obviously important issue being what the relative por-
t ions are.
Third, any new consensus that changes the arrange-
ments concerning who pays for dredging and who collects
the revenues will likely be connected with arrangements
for revenue allocation. The traditional process of con-
gressional negotiations associated with annual appropria-
tions bills will be questioned if such changes occur.
Depending on how revenues are raised and who raises them,
the payers of these revenues will likely insist on a
process that assures a return on investment in a rapid
mannner that at least partially assures that Hlajor payers
will be the major recipients of the benefits.
Fourth, any changes to the above three sets of
arrangements have the potential for changing the manag-
ment and implementation role of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers. For example, if the choice were for indivi-
dual ports to raise all of their o wn funds for dredging,
or a significant portion, it is quite possible that the
individual ports would seek to exercise management
control.
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Finally, the evolution of a new consensus on port
funding will require modifications in existing permit
approval processes. These processes apply to the dredg-
ing projects initiated by ports (or other local inter-
ests) that the ports will fund. Most proposals for
federa lly fund ed new cons truc t ion d redg ing will in vol ve
port-funded dredging as well, and depending on the fund-
ing mechanism finally selected, the permit process could
take on added importance or replace the Congressional
process. The ports have in recent years pressed for
changes in this process, arguing that it is indefinite
and without fixed limits. If required to raise and spend
more for port dredging, the ports will likely demand more
certain time horizons for investment decisions. The goal
will be to accelerate the approval process and for that
to occur, both legislative and regulatory changes may be
necessary.
Three options are possible as funding sources for
dredging. The first, the traditional source, is general
fund revenues. The second mak e s use of existing revenue
sources at individual ports. The third involves new
federal authorization for levying user fees or
specialized taxes.
General Fund Revenues
Although proposals aimed at finding a new consensus
on funding range across the spectrum, only one, the
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Reagan Administration's 1982 proposal, would totally
eliminate general fund revenues as a source. However, if
precedent is in any sense suggestive, the likelihood is
bigh that general fund revenues will continue to pay some
portion of dredging costs. For example, in 1982, accord-
ing to the Energy Information Agency, slightly over half
of the $23.3 billion in Federal expenditures for trans-
portation carne from general fund revenues (Energy Infor-
mation Administrtion, 1983). Of that amount, roughly
$337 million was expended on U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
operations and maintenance dredging at ports. Based on
the transportation precedent and the fact that, within
the Reagan Administration, all of the legislative propo-
sals are aimed at breaking the funding deadlock including
general fund revenues, it appears likely that any new
cons e nsus on funding will involve general tax revenues
a portion of dredging costs.
Present Port Revenues
Although some proposals aimed at breaking the fund-
ing deadlock have involved a combination of general fund
revenues and revenues raised through new federally au-
tho r i zed use r fee s, 0 n e 0 p t ion is to I e a vet h e po r t s
dependent on only those revenues that they could raise
under authorities now available to them. Ports have
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various sources of revenue. They range from wharfage and
dockage to leasing and warehousing revenues from non-port
activities. In many instances port authorities operate
airports and commercial properties which also earn reve-
nues. The capacity of ports to fund new dredging varies
greatly depending on the volume of cargo they handle, the
range of funding they have available, and the cost of
both construction and maintenance dredging.
At one extreme are ports such as Los Angeles and
Galveston, which faced with the present stalemate, are
prepared to pay construction dredging costs. Los Angeles
recently completed a deepening of the harbor (in connec-
tion with Federal dredging of the authorized project) to
depths ranging from 45 to 51 ft. at a cost to the port of
$37 million. Galveston is committed to deepening its
port to 56 ft. at a cost of $139 million.
The Port Authority of New York/New Jersey has indi-
cated to Congress that it is willing to pay the $110
million cost of a channel-deepening project, if assured
of an expidited permit-approval process. B~' comparison
"Baltimore continues to insist ~n 100 percent Federal
fund ing for its project because it is the only port
au thor ized to be deepened with Fed era 1 fund s" (Energy
Information Administration, 1983).
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At the other extreme, many small ports indicate tbat
they are without the capacity to pay the costs of new
dredging. A review of public statements by ports indi-
cate they are either unwilling or incapable of paying for
either routine maintenance dredging until sowe new con-
sensus bas been formalized by legislative action.
Considerable variation exists concerning the ability
of ports to pay all or a partial share of routine main-
tenance dredging and new construction dredging. How
ports are organized and how they perceive their roles
influences the rates they charge for port services. Some
are partially supported by state or local revenues, owing
to their importance in local and reg ional economies and
their competitive status with other nearby ports. Other
ports contribute revenues to state or local governments.
The range of port charters and institutional identities
represent various interpretations of their mixed public
and private sector nature. Ports vary in the degree of
control exercised by state or local governments, and
ports have differing recourse to state and local bond
issues.
Reviewing the existing rates levied by various ports
in the United States (or charges they are now a L'I ow ed to
levy by federal law) evidences these disparities. Whar-
fage charges per ton of general cargo average $3.50 to
$4.00 on the West Coast, $1.00 to $1.30 in the Gulf of
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~lexico, and $1.45 to $1.65 on the East Coast. Land
leases and other port charges exhibit a con~arable range.
Because the range of costs among geographical regions in
land, labor, and construction are not as great as the
range of port charges, the principal reason for the
remaining disparities would seem to be institutional
differences.
User Fees
New federally authorized user fees have been the
most frequently proposed vehicle for building a consensus
on funding. Substantial precedent exists for establisb-
ing port user fees as revenue sources. Slightly less
than half of the $23.3 billion expended by the federal
-
government in 1982 for transportation~as provded by user
fees.
In its 1982 budget submission, the Reagan Adminis-
tration sought to eliminate the use of general fund
revenues for dredging and replace them with funds raised
through new user fees. Under the Administration's propo-
sal, port user fees (together with inland waterway user
charges) were expected to raise $2.1 billion in revenues
over the 1983 to 1986 period (Office of Management and
Budget, 1981).
As interpreted in an Energy Information Administra-
tion (1983) report:
31
/
The AdmIn Ls t r a t i on vs proposal was aimed at removing
the federal subsidy fro m navigation programs, reducing
the growth in federal spending, and moving toward a
balanced budget. Besides r ed uc i nq federal budget defi-
cits, the justification for user fees rests on the effi-
cient and equitable allocation of limited federal funds.
In this argument, a user fee system becomes an efficient
ma r k e t test whereby only economically viable projects are
selected out of a rnu Lt I t ud e of proposals. Port develop-
ment yields significant benefits to port users who are
not only able to pay but should pay for the benefits.
User fees ease the burden on Federal funds thus promoting
more efficient and equitable allocation of thse limited
funds a mong competiting purposes.
As noted in this statement the Administration and
other advocates of user fees attribute three distinct
advantages to them: (1) new re v enu es, (2) ec on orn i.c ef f i-
ciency, and (3) economic equity.
In practice, e s t ab Li s h Lnq vs y s t e nrs which achieve the
stated benefits of user fees has turned out to be extre-
me ly d iff icu 1 t. In the case of port d redg ing, some
interests sin~ly reject the notion that standards such as
efficiency and equity should be applied. Quite clearly,
efficiency and equity standards applied in any pure form
would have the result of closing certain ports. Where
user fees threaten the existence of a port, efficiency
and equity arguments have little appeal.
An additional complication is the wide range of
differences in physical characteristics among the ports
of the United States. Those having lower maintenance
dredging requirements than other ports are opposed to
user fees, particularly if these fees are assessed on a
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national uniform basis. Therefore, the principal of
those recieving the benefits paying the bill cannot be
realized through a uniform nationwide fee. For example,
the Congressional Budget Office (1983) estilliates that a
system of full cost recovery for user fees for small
ports (less than tons per year) would require
those ports to charge a user fee of $90 per ton to
recover all costs associated with operations and mainten-
ance dredging now provided by the Corps of Engineers.
For large ports (over 10 million tons per year), the
charge wou Ld be $.20 per ton.
Another issue of controversy revolves around the
question of whether the users are the primary benefi-
ciaries of dredging. The user fee concept rests on the
assumption that the primary beneficiaries are the identi-
fiable users of a publicly provided service. In the case
of dredging, proposals for user fees generally call for a
levy against ships. Shipping interests regularly argue
that these proposals require them to carry the revenue
burden for dredging, while in fact there are many other
beneficiaries. Some economic analyses argue that in the
case of coal exports, for example, railroads, miners, and
retail and wholesale businesses in mining regions would
also be major beneficiaries.
Others carry the argument much further, suggesting
that deeper ports would have significant economic multi-
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plier effects for the national economy. A recent study
by the Corps of Engineers Los Angeles District (Data
Resources, Inc. 1983) projects the economic benefits, in
terms of total industrial production, from channel dredg-
ing and landfill developments in the port of Los Angeles
and Long Beach from the present to the year 2020. Figure
5 gives a brief su mma r y of the study's projected benefits
in direct and ind irect revenues and geographical compo-
nent. While the direct effects are concentrated in the
Lmmed iate area of the port, the ind irec t revenues are
distributed across the country. Bushnell, Pearsall, and
Trozzo, Inc. (1983) found simi lar ind i rec t ef fec ts
resulting from a uniform fee for maintenance dredging.
The argument at the national level is that increased
coal exports would reduce or balance the trade deficit,
lower unemployment (and with that, the need for federally
fund ed soc ia 1 ser vic es), and so on, to the end that new
construction dredging of ports should be paid for from
general fund revenues since the nation benefits. In a
complex economy it is simply impossible, so this argument
goes, to sort out the primary beneficiaries of port
dredging, with the result that levying fees against any
specific set of users is inherently inequitable.
Despite these difficulties, some analysts believe
that the answer is institutional. That is, the way to
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FIGURE 5
Regional Distribution of Industrial Production Revenues from
Channel Deepening and Landfill Developments, Los Angeles/Long
Beach, Californial 1983-2020 (total cummulative 1983 dollars in
millions) •
Los Angeles Fiye County Six State
County Reoional California Rea ion National
00
U1 Direct 1,056.8 1,396.9 1,682.0 1,697.8 1,832.8
Ind irect 179.3 249.7 456.2 711.0 4,830.7
Total 1,236.0 1,646.6 2,138.2 2,408.8 6,663.5
ports by withdrawing all federal support for dredging
whether for new construction or maintenance. Under this
arrangement, Congress would authorize the ports to levy
user fees in any way or at any level they were to deter-
~ine. Critics of this approach note that ports are
inherently creations of governments and cannot be made to
operate as purely private-sector organizations. They
note that legal and institutional character of U.S. ports
varies from ports managed by state governments, to those
that are the creations and responsibilities of city
governments, to others run by relatively autonomous port
authorities. These differihg situations have potentially
very different consequences for port financing.
While there are many sound reasons for enhancing
market-l Ik e cond it ions of port operations to make the
ports more profit-oriented, an underlying issue remains
with their public character; to whom do the ports really
belong? The importance of international trade to the
domestic economy of the United States, the dominance of
oceanborne shipping in international trade, and the role
of ports in national security and defense suggest that
the ports are national assets.
The form of the fee or tax obv iously has very d if-
ferent implications for different interests as well as
for the costs of collecting the fee. The key point is
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that while analysts may assess user fee options based on
abstract standards, those interested in port dreoging are
-:
concerned about who benefits and who pays. In the con-
text of support for various port funding proposals, the
divisions are clear. Low-volurae ports with high-cost
dredging requirements support a uniform national user
fee. Such a fee is attractive because it requires high-
volume, low-cost ports to provide subsidies to Low-ev o Luir.e
ports. For these reusons, high-volume, low-dredging-cost
ports prefer a user fee which is port specific.
In the same context, shippers of high-value, low-
volume commodities favor a tonnaged-based fee, whether
national or port specific. Alternatively, high-volume,
Low-r v a Lu e shippers prefer an ad valorem tax, whether
levied on a nationally uniform basis or on an individual
port basis.
Two conclusions flow from review of the user fee
debate. First, user fees are being proposed as a vehicle
for finding a new national consensus on port funding.
Second, there is no agreement on the role ..o-euser fees
should play or how they should be applied. If user fees
turn out to be the structure around which a new funding
consensus is evolved, it will be because they serve as a
mechanism for evolving compromises. The conflict over
funding is a conflict of values and goals, a conflict
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about who pays and who benefits. Those conflicts can
only be resolved in the policital process with political ~
-,,- -- -----
--Intertwined with the proposals for alternative sour-
ces of revenues are various proposals concerning who
should collect the revenues. Three categories of options
exist. The first would have all revenue raised by the
federal government. If all revenues were to continue to
be derived from general taxes, the dominant federal role
would remain the same. The Reagan Administration's pro-
posal would retain the same federal dominance, but would
derive all dredging revenues from a new source, a user
fee.
Second ly, and at the other extreme, Lnd i v idual ports
could be made responsible for raising all revenues. This
arrangement would exist if ports were required to raise
revenues from existing sources, or if the federal govern-
ment passed legislation authorizing ports to establish
new taxes or user fees to be determined by individual
ports.
The third option would have both federal government
and -i nd i v i d u a l ports raising some portion of the revenue.
A review of the proposed legislation dealing with dredg-
ing indicates that every proposal with the exception of
the Administration's first (100 percent cost recovery)
calls for some form of joint funding by the federal
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government and individual ports. Stated differently,
most efforts to build a consensus on port funding have
included what are known as cost-sharing arrangements.
In the case of port dredging, the motives behind
cost-sharing proposals have as their goal, getting the
ports to assume responsibility for a greater portion of
funding for an activity which traditionally has been
fully funded by the federal government (except for local
sponsor costs). Cost-sharing is a way to transfer what
have traditionally been federal responsibilities and cost
to state and local level.
To the extent that cost sharing is attractive to
individual ports, it is because such cost sharing is seen
as a way either to increase the absolute level of federal
funding by offering a formula which would reduce the
percentage or the proportion of federal funding, or to
achieve some other benefit such as fast tracking of
required regulatory review. Given the funding stalemate,
many observers believe that the only way to increase
federal dollars is for the individual ports to assume
some greater portion of the costs. Cost-sharing, there-
fore, may be attractive to individual ports as a vehicle
to pry loose additional federal dollars to pay for new
construction dredging or increased maintenance dredging,
or for both.
89
It Dillst be emphasized that the cost-sharing concept
does not inherently provide any answers to the question
of who will ?ay. The federal government's portion of any
cost-shar ing formula could come from either general fund
revenues or from a new tax or user fee. Similarly, in
tDe case of indivioual ports, revenues for cost-sharing
could corne either from existing sources such as wharfage,
dockage, stevedoring, and harbor transfers or from state
and local tax revenues, or they could come from federally
au thor ized user fees.
Although cost-sharing is an integral part of most
proposals aimed at finding a new consensus on funding,
the principal does not imply anything about the source of
revenues. The range of proposals for cost-sharing is
potentially infinite. What is clear is that if cost-
shar ing is to be one of the elements of a new fund ing
consensus, it will require the establishment of a for~ula
that is broad ly acceptab Ie, and ac h iev ing acceptab iIi ty
will involve a complex set of political compromises.
The most recent legislative acts include the House
of Representatives Water Resource Development Act (HR-6),
in which the House has approved authorization of more
than 300 water projects for flood control, harbor dredg-
ing, and other purposes totaling some $20 billion. The
Senate has also voted to approve a bill (S-1567), which
is similar to HR-6, since it also establishes new user
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fees and cost-sharing formulas to pay for the projects.
The major difference between the two bills is in the
number of projects the two bills authorize. It is esti-
mated that the House bill would cost about $8 billion
more than the Senate b ill. Another difference is in t he
treatment of the barge fuel tax, which the House bill
freezes at current levels ($.10 per ~allon) but which the
Senate bill raises in increments of one cent per year, to
$.20 per gallon by 1997. It now remains for conferees
from the House and Senate to resolve the differences
between the two bills. These two bills authorize the
first large-scale program to build or iillprove ports,
harbors, inland waterways and other projects in 16 years.
Non-Funding Issues
Almost without exception, proposals for new funding
and collection arrangements a i med at find ing a new con-
sensus on port dredging have involved calls for what has
become known as fast tracking. Most of the parties
interested in port dredging find the present 20 year (or
more in some cases) lead time which has characterized
completed projects to be unacceptable (see Table 9). So
long as general funds are the source of dredging money,
long lead times served to prov ide a stable env ironment
within which priorities for port projects could evolved.
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TABLE 9 Average schedule for navigation projects, u.s. Army
Corps of Engineers
ACTIVITX'
Survey/study
author hed
\D
N
Funds for study
appropr iated
Study/survey
sent to division
Report sent to
Congress
Project authorized
4.9 years
4.1 years
1.5 years
0.6 year
Initial funds
appropriated for
preconstruct ion
planning, engineering
Initial construction
funds appropriated
First contract award
YEARS
1.9 years
5.8 years
2.8 years
TOTAL TIME 21.6
SOURCE; General Accounting Office, 1984.
With the arrival of the funding stalemate, however, de-
mands for fast tracking have received increasing attention.
What fast tracking would involve seems to vary.
Discussions pursuant to finding a new consensus have
ranged from escaping the requirement for congressional
authorization for new construction dredging, to substan-
tially accelerated permit approval for locally funded
dredging and filling projects by the involved Federal and
State agencies. Fast tracking, that is, reducing the
lead times either for congressional project authoriza-
tions or for agency permit approvals, becomes increasing-
ly important with progressively lower Federal funding .f o r
port dredging. When the Federal government paid a major
portion of the costs for new construction dredging, the
time value of money did not become a major issue. How-
ever, if individual ports assume all or a major portion
of the costs for new construction dredging, the present
long lead times and the present and future time factors
of inflation and money may change the balance of benefit-
cost ratios. Certainly for dredging/filling projects
necessary to the development of a new terminal, securing
outside financing is likely to be the critical factor in
proceeding with the project. The ability to secure tenant
financing will be impossible if the prevailing long lead
tiilles continue. Similar considerations apply to projects
involving dredging or filling that the ports have tradi-
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tionally funded, but that need permit approvals. For any
major port-funded project, the single issue of greatest
importance in the present open-ended and indefinite per-
mit-approval process is the inability to fix the time
horizon of decision making, or to identify an end-point.
It should be emphasized that any changes in any of
the previous categories of issues will doubtless also
require some kind of modification in, at a minimum, the
dredging approval process. Without this, the possibility
of a funding consensus appears dim. Without some agree-
ment on fast tracking and although all other points could
be resolved, the nation would find itself with a con-
tinued lack of dredging.
The Institutional Decision Making System
Decision making for port dredging became a major
concern for two reasons. One has been discussed pre-
viously; the paralysis of funding for traditionally
federal dredging projects. The second, closely related
reason is the frustratingly long time that now elapses in
the decision making process for approval of traditionally
local projects, and for bringing proposed federal pro-
jects to congressional consideration.
The institutional decision making process for port
dredging is complex, unpredictable, and fragmented. It
is the product of leg islation and regulation accumulated
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over the past 150 years. As constituted today, the
system requires or provides opportunity for participation
by Congress, tbe courts, a large number of federal agen-
cies, as well as state and local governments, and many
interest groups. The interest groups engaged in particu-
lar decisions may be numerous und diverse, such as:
commercial and other entities associated with ports,
shipping 'and transportation firms, environmental organi-
zations, citizens groups, and other members of the local
population.
The system's complexity reflects its need to add r e s s
and manage a complex set of needs and concerns. No
dredging project represents an unmixed blessing to all
concerned, and there may be many _concerned. Dredging
decisions must assess a great deal of sometiffies conflic-
ting data, and balance a diverse set of interests that
are frequently vigorously advocated.
Decisions involve: which ports to dredge; who will
pay for the dredging; what the approporiate design of the
port will be; how it will be dredged; where the dredged
material will be disposed; how best to manage the envi-
ronmental effects; and how to respond appropr iately to
the concerns and responsibilities of governmental organi-
zations and non-governmental interest groups. Many of
these elements vary from one port to another, and fluc-
tuate with time. Decision making about port development
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must resolve real issues, gather and analyze real data,
and find acc ommod a t i on aruo nq conflicting interests.
In the case of major federal projects, the decision
making process may take as long as 22 years. For most
local projects, the time is generally shorter, but still
far too long from the point of view of those proposing
the project. Not surprisingly, then, a wide range of
interests concerned with port dredging have expressed
q r ow i nq dissatisfaction with the decision u.ak i nq process.
This dissatisfaction has led to ever more frequent
calls for what has come to be known as fast tracking.
Although fast tracking has not been clearly defined, its
advocates do agree that the objectives are speed, predic-
tability, and stability.
The important role and responsibilities of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers in all port dredging projects,
whether federally or locally funded, makes the federal
govenment the focus of concern of those who advocate fast
tracking. The federal role in ports results from three
basic developments. First, the Constitution of the
United States prohibits discrimination among the nation's
ports by the federal government. Second, since the pas-
sage in 1824 of the General Survey Act, the Corps has bad
primary responsibility to oversee or carry out dredging
for the nation's ports. The Corps initial responsbility
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was to ensure navigability. Some of this responsibility
is now taken by the U. S. Coast Guard (placement of aids
to navigation). Ensuring navigability by dredging is
still a responsbility of the Corps. Third, during the
late 1960s and the decade following, a broad set of
environmental legislation gave the Corps and a variety of
other federal agencies responsibility for assessing the
environmental consequences of dredging and other activi-
ties and for ensuring that those activities met standards
adopted to protect the environment. The key institution-
al consequence of this body of legislaton was to require
that the Corps take responsibility far beyond navigation
and to assure that it coordinated and cooperated with a
variety of other federal agencies as well as state and
local governments. The Corps, then, is the key and lead
federal agency for dredging activities irrespective of
or ig in or fund ing.
Each port is un i que , The design and construction of
each port, and the environmental protection actions re-
quired must reflect the specific characteristics of the
individual facility. Similarly, the political and econo-
mic circumstances and the c omp Le x of interest groups and
governmental agencies involved also differ from port to
port. In the case of federal projects, even at the
congressional level, port authorization and appropria-
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tions and the specific parameters mandated for port con-
struction are port-specific rather than programmatic.
Any successful effort to bring greater speed to construc-
tion projects must be based on the recognition that each
port is un ique.
Further, even if the decision making process can be
speeded up, and the time required to make decisions
shortened, port projects still take years. During that
time, both port needs and the understanding of the envi-
ronmental and other implications of port dredging can
change. For example, the movement toward large bulk
carriers and the use of containerships occurred rapidly.
Similarly, an understanding of appropriate methods for
handling different dredged materials has increased rapid-
ly in the last decade, and offers resolution to many
issues where previous uncertainty led to polarizations
among participants. Any fast tracking system, therefore,
needs to assure flexibility to allow consideration of the
uniqueness of each port, and to allow efficient integra-
tion of new needs and understanding to the decision
mak ing process.
Summary
Any new consensus on port funding that allows the
funding barrier to be overcome will require the resolu-
tion of five issues: (1) the source of revenues, (2) who
will collect the revenues, (3) how the revenues will be
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allocated, (4) who will handle the management and imple-
mentation of port dredging, and (5) the integration into
this process of some kind of modification in approval
processes that allows for more expeditious initiation and
completion of port dredging. It is essential that the
political process address all issues if a new consensus
on port funding is to be found that allows the nation to
overcome the funding barrier.
The general pattern of decision making that charac-
terizes the regulatory system governing port dredging is
that decisions occur only when consensus is achieved.
Consensus in this sense is defined as existing when no
significant participants object so strongly to the action
that they are willing to mobilize and oppose it. One
other point that deserves emphasis in addition to inher-
ent legal and political pressures for finding a consensus
is the possibility of court action. Particularly in the
case of state and local agencies and private interests
groups, strong objection to the approval of any permit or
particular action within the context of federal projects
can be opposed in the courts. Objectors do not necessar-
ily -have to win in the courts to win their point. If the
court provides a vehicle for substantial delay and that
delay is costly to the proposers of the project, the
threat of going to court becomes a powerful negotiating
tool in the hands of objectors. Although this point is
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not ad d r e s s ed formally in any of the Corps or otber
agency documents, it is an essential reality for all of
the participants in regulatory decision making.
The availability of the courts reinforces a widely
noted characteristics of the regulatory decision making
process in the United States. That is, that opponents
and objectors eleal within a system where the processes
a r e weighted in their favor. For any headway in the
decision making system to be achieved, all significant
participants have to be in agreement at least to the
point of not organizing opposition. To keep things from
happening, only one significant participant has to oppose
vigorously.
The Corps' lead role in the regulatory system for
port dredging reflects the need for consensus. While in
specific instances it may be possible to find the Corps
acting over the objection of a major participant, it is
clear ly not the norm. In fact ,it is d iff icu 1 t to con-
ceive how the decision making system could be modified.
nany advocates of fast tracking have called for
comprehensive legislative regulatory change designed to
streamline the decision making system and accelerate
decisions. Although these proposals have much to recom-
mend in the abstract, they typically do not take into
account the need of the decision making system to balance
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an extremely complex set of needs and interests. For
this reason, some of the proposals that have called for
Congress to concentrate decision making in a single auth-
ority, presumably the Corps, such that the Corps c ould
act over the objections of major participants would ap-
pear to be unrealistic. In the case of port dredging,
the possibility of building a majority to support a
comprehensive legislative change making fast tracking
possible does not appear likely.
Alternatively, numerous specific proposals have been
made for ~odifyin9 particular regulations or particular
coordination procedures (General Accounting Office, 1978,
1984; Comptroller General of the United States, 1980).
The Corps has already demonstrated the capacity to acce-
lerate decision making in some of its own activities for
federal dredging projects. Doubtlessly there are many
opportunities for improvement and acceleration of deci-
sion making in this context.
With regard to federal projects, the greatest oppor-
tunity for acceleration in decision making rests with
Congress. With regard to its decision making, however,
Congress is a law unto itself. Perhaps opportunities
exist for accelerating decision making once Congress has
found an answer to the funding issue. Given a funding
stalemate, discussion of fast tracking federal projects
will not be a reality.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Smln~\RY AND CONCLUSIO~,l
The quest ion whether p o r ts in t~le Un i t ed States are
adequate to serve the nation's needs became a major
public concern this decade. Attention focused on port
adequacy when, as a result of the Iranian Revolution,
vzo r Ld d ernand for U.S. coal explodecl. During 1980, tbe
n2WS media in the United States were full of reports that
large nu mbe r s of colliers were waiting for we ek s and
sometimes months to gain access to U.S. coal-loading
facilities. During this same period, a nuwber of studies
concluded that the United States had the opportunity to
become a major supplier of the world market for steam
coal. To gain and secure that market the United States
would n e e d to be able to handle tile most efficient dry-
bulk carriers, and such carriers require greater water
depths than those aVailable at U.S. coal ports.
The U.S. economic well-being was seen as being de-
p e nd en t on the nat ion's capac i ty to compete in a wo r ld
economy. Particularly for higb-volume, low cost commodi-
ties SUC~l as coal, efficient transportation was viewed as
an essential ingredient to American competitiveness. For
such commodities, large bulk carriers were believed to
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offer major econoffiies of scale. Many of those involved
in ocean transportation noted that the United States
would only be able to enjoy these economies of scale if
it developed substantially deeper ports, ports capable of
handling large deep-draft vessels.
Although the advantages and trends to larger vessels
in the world fleet were evident, the 1970s saw little in
the way of a response to these percieved n e e d s for deeper
ports was the result of an unraveling of the social
contract that had been in place for a century ago between
the federal government and the ports concerning how both
maintenance and new construction dredging would be funded
and implemented. By the 1980s, many ports had proposals
for improvement dredging projects and no significant new
construction dredg ing had occ u r ed for a decade.
The central conclusion of this paper is that the
nation needs limited additional capacity to handle large
vessels. It is important to emphasize two reasons for
this conclusion. First, the United States faces great
uncertainty with regard to the size and character of the
future world economy, the nature of future oceanborne
tr;ansportation into and out of U.S. ports, and the future
mix of commodities that the nation will export and im-
port. Further, the character of U.S. exports and Lmp o r t s
particularly exports of such bulk commodities as coal and
aq r Icu Ltu r a L products, is likely to fluctuate greatly
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from year to year. Mos t of the analyses and a r quruen t s
usee by proponents and opponents of additional port capa-
city to handle large vessels start with assumptions about
t he future size and character of U.S. trade and trans-
port. All assumptions must be v i ewed as uncertain.
Decisions with regard to developing additional port capa-
city, therefore, must be made with the recognition that
future needs are difficult to determine.
There is less uncertainty about the tilne required to
develop additional port capacity. Port construction
requires long lead times that will be measured in years.
In the case of major federal dredging projects, the lead
time is now 22 years. The nation, therefore, faces a
fundamental mismatch between the uncertain and fluctu-
ating character of future needs and the long times re-
quired to develop additional port capacity. A decision
to develop additional capacity, therefore, involves
risks. Unless those risks are taken, however, the United
States precludes itself the future opportunity to take
advantage of any benefits offered by large vessels. It
must be emphasized that particularly with regard to bulk
commodities, extreme swings in trade and transport have
traditionally occurred over very short time periods. To
take advantage of rapidly expanding markets, the nation
mus t have available port capacity when those swings oc-
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cur. To protect against the loss of those markets when
wo r Ld d eraand declines, the nation must be able to offer
its product at the lowest possible cost.
A consensus does not exist among the expert
community on the costs and benefits of deeper ports. In
the face of uncertainty it is prudent to have increased
options insuring that a capability exists to enjoy maxi-
mum benefits given a wide range of future developments.
Several developments led to this consensus judgment
of the growing importance of world trade to the economic
we II-be ing of the Un i ted States; (1) a trend to larg er
vessels because they offer economies of scale; (2) the
importance of ocean transportation costs in the delivered
price of high-volume, low-cost commodities, such as coal;
(3) the growing number of deep-water ports in other
countries; (4) rapid year to year fluctuation in trade in
paricular commodities; and the long lead times required
to develop deep port capacity, and therefore the inabil-
ity to develop additional port capacity in response to
short-term fluctuation and need.
The preferred options for developing additional
capacity to handle large vessels are: (1) dredging exist-
ing Qulticommodity ports and (2) lightering/topping-off.
For a range of vessels and cargoes, there is no adequate
alternative to conventional ports and harbors for loading
or discharging. Existing ports offer sheltered water for
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cargo handling discharging without delay, access to
developed storage and cargo transfer facilities, well-
developed connections to inland transportation, and esta-
blished worldwide @arketing networks. Dredging to in-
crease the capacity of existing ports yields maximum
future flexibility to respond to changes in trade, and to
support defense mobilization as well as offering the
broadest base for recovering the cost of dredging and
distributing the benefits. The lowest cost alternative
to dredging is lightering/topping-off. This alternative
already exists in the United States, and offers a flex-
ible response to the need to load and unload bulk car-
riers.
Resolving the funding stalemate will require addres-
sing the following issues: (1) the sources of revenue,
(2) who will collect the revenues, (3) how the revenues
will be allocated, (4) who will handle the management and
implementation of port dredging, and (5) what the pre-
ceeding four changes will mean for management and regula-
tory approval process associated with port dredging pro-
jects. It is important that Congress address all tbese
issues if port dredging is to be expedited.
The complexity of the institutional decision making
system for port dredging reflects the need to address and
manage a large and difficult set of real needs and con-
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cerns. However, the system does not allow for timely
port development, either of federally or locally funded
projects. Actions need to be taken by Congress, the
regulatory agencies, and the ports to achieve speed,
predictability, and stability in decision making.
Ports are a national resource. The United States
and world economies are increasingly interdependent, and
most trade among nations is oceanborne. Enlarging the
physical capacity of U.S. ports could make our exports
mor e competitive and reduce the inland cost of imports.
These conclusions, as well as the potential role of
ports in. national security and defense, argue for addi-
tional port capacity with continued federal funding.
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